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INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, federal prosecutions of organizations have
sharply accelerated under a new paradigm that I call "structural reform prosecution." Traditionally, federal prosecutors rarely pursued entire organizations. Broad federal statutes and respondeat
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superior standards allowed prosecutors to charge an entity with a
crime for the act of a single agent. Organizations feared the catastrophic punitive fines and severe reputational consequences of a
conviction-what one court described as a "matter of life and
death."' But despite their substantial power, federal prosecutors
seldom exercised it, out of concern for the collateral consequences
to an organization and also the harm to employees, stockholders,
and the public. Recently, however, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") adopted a novel strategy by prosecuting large organizations far more often, but leveraging the prosecutions to secure
adoption of sweeping internal reforms.2 Without obtaining an indictment, much less a conviction, the DOJ recently prevailed on
thirty-five leading corporations to enter into demanding settlements, including AIG, America Online, Boeing, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI,
Merrill Lynch & Co., and Monsanto, as well as several public entities.'
This new settlement approach avoids the collateral consequences of an indictment, while using the prosecution as a "spur
for institutional reform."' By entering into agreements with organizations, prosecutors imposed rigorous requirements to promote
compliance. For example, in 2005, KPMG International agreed to
shut down its entire private tax practice, to cooperate fully in the
investigation of former employees, and to retain an independent
monitor-a former Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
chairman-for three years, in order to implement an elaborate
compliance program.5 Such agreements became common as prosecutors initiated more organizational prosecutions than before in re-

United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal docketed,
No. 06-4358 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2006).
2 Throughout this Article, I use "DOJ" to refer to federal prosecutors both at the
main office and the various U.S. Attorneys' Offices collectively. I do this only for
convenience, because, as I will describe, the individual offices and line attorneys exercise substantial independence. I otherwise refer to individual U.S. Attorneys' Offices,
the central office, divisions, or task forces separately.
'See infra Appendix A.
4
John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men, A.B.A. J., June 2003, at 46, 48 (quoting thenAssistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff).
'See infra Section I.A.
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sponse to post-Enron corporate fraud scandals.6 The agreements
form a part of the larger fabric of federal response to a perceived
breakdown in corporate culture that has also included passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and enhanced regulatory enforcement targeting corporate fraud.7
Unlike those legislative and administrative responses, structural
reform prosecutions raise questions about the reach of federal executive branch power. The Senate Judiciary Committee questioned
tactics used by the DOJ, as did the American Bar Association and
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation.8 Other critics of the
DOJ strategy with a different perspective, such as Ralph Nader,
called failures to convict organizations a "shocking" and "systematic derogation" of the DOJ's duty to seek justice.9 White collar defense practitioners complained in the press that federal prosecutors
"exploit[] their virtually unchecked power to extract and coerce
ever greater concessions."'" Professor Richard Epstein stated that
"the agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge
trial."" All sides agree that for good or ill, federal prosecutors exercise vast discretion; Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. commented

6See infra Section II.A.
7

See, e.g., Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 303 (2004) (describing "pervasiveness of the sudden surge in financial irregularities in the late 1990s" and regulatory responses).
'See Lynnley Browning, Justice Department Is Reviewing Corporate Prosecution
Guidelines, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2006, at C3; ABA Presidential Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml
(last visited Feb. 3, 2007); Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report 13
(2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee Interim ReportREV2.pdf.
'Letter from Ralph Nader & Robert Weissman to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney
Gen. (June 5, 2006), posted at Multinational Monitor Editor's Blog,
http://multinationalmonitor.org/editorsblog/index.php?/archives/26-The-Boeing-DOJDebacle.html (July 6, 2006, 15:34 EST); see Michael Seigel, Corporate America Fights
Back, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2007, at A15.
0
N. Richard Janis, Taking the Stand: Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of
the Federal Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice Is Being Destroyed,
Wash. Law., Mar. 2005, at 32, 34, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/
resources/publications/washington lawyer/march_2005/stand.cfm.
" Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, Wall. St. J., Nov.
28, 2006, at A14.
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that they have "something close to absolute power" when negotiating organizational settlements.'2
Some indications of overreaching already are apparent in instances where prosecutors exacted seemingly unrelated terms, although, as discussed below, what counts as an abuse is contested in
an area where prosecutors retain such broad discretion. In 2003,
the New York Racing Association ("NYRA"), a state-franchised
operation, agreed to install "video lottery terminals," or slot machines, at its race tracks. Federal prosecutors imposed this term
only because state officials hoped to use the revenue from the slot
machines to comply with a court ruling requiring adequate public
school funding.'3 Similarly, in 2004, MCI (the entity that replaced
WorldCom) entered into an agreement with state prosecutors in
Oklahoma to settle accounting fraud charges. State officials feared
that MCI might face bankruptcy if indicted, leading to job losses
and harm to state pension plans with MCI stock. The agreement
required MCI to create 1600 jobs over ten years in Oklahoma.
MCI was later fined when it did not create those jobs as promised.'4
Nor do prosecutors quickly relinquish their power. They retain
the authority to prosecute based on their unilateral decision that an
organization breached the agreement." The agreements typically
do not provide for judicial review of implementation or of any alleged breach, and they often require the organization's permanent
future cooperation.
This recent wave of structural reform prosecutions is not the first
time that the litigation process has been used to effect organizational change. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, private attorneys
general increasingly sought structural reform of public entities by
bringing lawsuits against government entities, including challenges
to school segregation, conditions in mental hospitals and prisons,
and housing discrimination. These lawsuits were "structural reform" cases because they sought more than cease-and-desist orders
by requiring ongoing judicial oversight of government institutions.
2

John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has it gone too far?, Nat'l L.J., July 25,
2005, at 13.
"See infra notes 262-63.
See Barbara Hoberock, MCI Coughs Up $280,000 Payment to State, Tulsa World,
Mar. 31, 2005, at Al.
" See infra Section ll.B.
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Courts later restricted the scope of prospective remedies for reasons of equitable restraint, federalism, comity, and countermajoritarian legitimacy, but over time, a consistent body of remedial law
emerged to guide government actors in a range of contexts.
The emerging approach towards structural reform prosecutions
knows no such bounds. Federal prosecutors, unlike civil rights
plaintiffs, operate as politically accountable public actors to whom
courts remain highly deferential. In the past, however, the DOJ
had not sought to reshape Fortune 500 companies, much less to
achieve "deterrence on a massive scale" of entire industries.16 We
should be examining these prosecutions carefully because of their
national importance and because structural reform is a new goal
for federal criminal law. Legal scholars have not critically examined this bold new prosecutorial mission.17 Nor have any scholars
explored the problem of structural reform of organizations through
criminal prosecutions, perhaps due to the traditional view that
structural reform occurred only in civil rights cases. 8 Civil struc6 Memorandum

from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of

Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfl
businessorganizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
17Little scholarship to date has critically examined the DOJ's recent deferral strategy, and none treats the problem as one of structural reform of organizational criminality. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The
Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2006)
(suggesting that corporations try to negotiate more lenient terms and describing variation between the agreements among different U.S. Attorneys' Offices); Benjamin M.
Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863, 1901 (2005)
(proposing that courts act as fiduciaries for third parties affected by deferral agreements). The only additional commentary on recent structural efforts by the DOJ was
written by current or former DOJ prosecutors and usefully explains DOJ policy and
practice. See Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of
Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the
U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1043 (2006) (praising the DOJ's new approach); Christopher A. Wray
& Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095, 1095-98 (2006)
(describing DOJ practice and its impact). Several pieces criticize recent deferred
prosecution agreements but only regarding the specific subject of privilege waiver, an
issue tangential to this project but discussed infra text accompanying notes 251-52.
See, e.g., George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 985, 993 (2005).
" My hope is that this piece will begin to link criminal law structural reform scholarship to scholarship on civil structural remedies. Professor James Jacobs, in his land-
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tural reform litigation engendered an important literature regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of such interventions." Similar questions should be asked again by courts, scholars, and practitioners
about structural reform in criminal cases. In this piece, I shed light
on why prosecutors chose to pursue structural reform, I provide an
empirical description of these structural reform efforts by prosecutors, and I begin the project of exploring questions regarding their
clarity, scope, effectiveness, the alternatives, and the ability of
prosecutors and courts to police them.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. The first Part introduces the
structural reform prosecution by describing the KPMG case and
contrasting the classic civil structural reform model and its judicial
limits with the vast discretion of prosecutors. I discuss how prosecutors might decide to exercise their discretion without seeking to
accomplish structural reform at all. The DOJ could seek to impose
optimally deterrent fines, but the dire collateral consequences of
such an approach make it highly undesirable. Or the DOJ could
wholly cease prosecuting organizations and focus on prosecuting
individuals, deferring to civil litigation or federal regulatory actors
with expertise in governance reform. This approach, however,
would ignore direction from Congress to prosecute organizations. '
The DOJ instead reserved prosecution for serious cases and in
those cases sought structural reform remedies early to avoid the
harsh effects of an indictment.

mark book on civil RICO labor racketeering prosecutions, is one of the few to recognize a need for scholarship connecting the history of structural reform litigation in
civil rights cases and in federal organized crime prosecutions. See James B. Jacobs,
Mobsters, Unions, and Feds: The Mafia and the American Labor Movement 246
(2006).
'9 See infra Section I.B.
Regarding the problem of overbroad and vague federal criminal law, see, for example, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 244-45 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345; Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and
Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 908-25 (2005). Regarding the unique problem of
organizational punishment, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 833 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr.. "No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984).
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In Part II, I describe the current approach in which prosecutors
obtain structural reform settlements at the charging stage through
deferral or nonprosecution agreements. While the DOJ's current
deferred prosecution approach raises concerns about executive
power, it remains more complex than it first appears. I provide an
empirical study of the terms in agreements the DOJ has negotiated
to date (summarized in Appendices A and B) to assess how prosecutors have exercised their discretion in practice.21 This empirical
analysis shows that the DOJ, in the four years after adopting its
new policy in 2001, has by and large stayed true to its stated mission and consistently pursued compliance by negotiating the appointment of independent monitors and requiring compliance programs. Out of these agreements a consistent remedial approach
emerged. These agreements tracked the federal Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, which already mitigate sentences for organizations with "effective" compliance programs. Yet the DOJ
also exercised broad discretion to include terms unrelated to compliance and reserved for itself supervision of compliance and the
unilateral power to declare a breach. Further, several alternative
means to obtain structural reform were available, operating at later
stages of a criminal case with greater judicial oversight. As another
option, prosecutors could have sought parallel civil remedies. The
DOJ chose to depart from those more traditional means for obtaining compliance. Instead, the DOJ chose to seek structural reform at the charging stage, chiefly to minimize the dire consequences of an indictment to an organization. Judicial review is also
very deferential at the charging stage, however, giving prosecutors
especially wide discretion.
In Part III, I explore issues raised by structural reform prosecutions, beginning with a section framing what "prosecutorial abuse"
could mean in an area where prosecutors retain such broad discretion. In the civil context, the legitimacy of structural reform was
questioned when private plaintiffs sought supervision of government by courts. Those concerns do not apply here. I develop how
judicial review in the criminal context, unlike in civil cases, remains
quite deferential, for doctrinal and institutional reasons, and particularly at the charging stage. Other concerns in civil cases related
2

See infra Appendices A & B.
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to the broad reach of remedies. Those concerns were over time addressed in some respects by judicial limits and in others by common acceptance of the effectiveness of certain remedies. Given a
limited role for judicial review, the DOJ itself may be the entity
with the greatest ability to shape its structural reform approach,
absent intervention by Congress. Already, organizations and Congress have created pressure leading the DOJ to moderate its approach. If the DOJ, and perhaps regulators, organizations, courts,
or Congress, make explicit an understanding that prosecutors now
pursue a structural reform approach, and then further clarify this
set of remedial practices, structural interventions may evolve towards a more predictable crime deterrent.
I. STRUCTURAL REFORM AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Prosecutors have long sought to combat organizational crime in
various forms, but, in a paradigm shift, they increasingly attempt to
reform institutions themselves rather than impose punitive fines
and imprisonment upon individual offenders. I first present the
story of the KPMG deferred prosecution to illustrate the scope of
these structural reform efforts. In the second Section in this Part, I
tie these efforts to the classic civil model for structural reform litigation. Prosecutors now employ some of the same tools developed
by private attorneys general. Third, I explore the alternatives to
pursuing structural reform that prosecutors could have chosen and
suggest some reasons why they did not. I show how the structural
reform agenda of prosecutors was shaped by the substance of federal criminal law and the power and discretion of prosecutors in
our criminal system.
A. The KPMG ProsecutionDeferred
One Assistant U.S. Attorney explained that what I term structural reform prosecutions provide "a way to get better results more
quickly.... We're getting the sort of significant reforms you might
not even get following a trial and conviction."2 2 The KPMG case
provides a vivid illustration of the injunctive terms federal prosecu"2Vanessa Blum, Justice Deferred: The Feds' New Weapon of Choice Makes Companies Turn Snitch to Save Themselves, Legal Times, Mar. 21, 2005, at 1 (quoting the
lead Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Computer Associates case).
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tors obtain in agreements resolving the most high-profile corporate
prosecutions, and the successes and flaws of such settlements.
By 2005, it emerged that KPMG, one of the largest accounting
firms in the world, engaged in tax fraud that resulted in $2.5 billion
in evaded taxes by wealthy individuals. As early as 2001, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") investigated certain tax shelters and
issued summonses to KPMG, with which KPMG did not comply,
prompting the IRS to seek judicial enforcement in 2002.23 A Senate
Subcommittee began an investigation and at hearings in November
2003, KPMG employees were questioned.2" By 2004, the IRS referred the case to the DOJ for possible criminal prosecution.25
In 2004, a criminal complaint was filed by the DOJ against
KPMG, "the largest criminal tax case ever filed."26 In 2004 and
2005, KPMG and prosecutors at the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York entered into lengthy
discussions. KPMG offered to cooperate and "clean house" to save
the company and avoid an indictment.27 The negotiations operated
at a high level, with executives meeting directly with the U.S. Attorney."
On August 25, 2005, after the grand jury had been convened but
before an indictment had been issued, the DOJ and IRS announced that the criminal prosecution of KPMG would not go
forward, though prosecution of individual employees would proceed, because an agreement had been reached.29 U.S. Attorney
23See
24See

United States v. KPMG, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2004).
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal dock-

eted, No. 06-4358 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2006).
25See id. at 339.
26 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05-ag-433.html; Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Attorney for KPMG (Aug.
26, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf
[hereinafter KPMG Agreement].
27See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
See id. at 348.
21See id. at 349; see also Sue Reisinger, Mr. Clean, Corp. Counsel, Nov. 2005, at 82,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1131425800801. The
DOJ had been intent on pursuing a trial, in part because of perceived evasion by
KPMG in not turning over documents. Id. at 85. Ultimately, negotiations that included KPMG's new general counsel, former U.S. District Judge Sven Erik Holmes,
produced an agreement. Id. at 87-88.
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General Alberto Gonzales cited "the reality that the conviction of
an organization can affect innocent workers and others associated
with the organization, and can even have an impact on the national
economy.""
Though federal courts have statutory authority to reject the deferral of a prosecution, District Judge Loretta A. Preska apparently
ratified it on August 29, 2005, after a hearing and without any alterations to the terms.3 The resulting deferred prosecution agreement provided a remarkable blueprint for radical structural change
at KPMG.
The agreement begins with a detailed admission of wrongdoing,
stating that KPGM "[a]ssisted high net worth United States citizens to evade United States individual income taxes on billions of
dollars in capital gain and ordinary income by developing, promoting and implementing unregistered and fraudulent tax shelters."32
The agreement provided for a payment of $456 million, including
fines and full restitution to the IRS.33 The provisions placed "permanent restrictions" on KPMG's tax practice, barring taking on
new private tax clients, terminating its tax and benefits practice,
preventing it from issuing advice and selling certain pre-packaged
tax products, and limiting work for individual clients. 4 The agreement is also "permanent" in that it requires continuing cooperation
with the DOJ, without any time limit.
The compliance reforms reached further. KPMG agreed to "implement and maintain an effective compliance and ethics program
that fully comports with the criteria set forth in Section 8B2.1 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines."3 Attorney General
Gonzales called this the "most important" part of the agreement,

Id. at 89.

311

See United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:05-CR-00903-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,
2005) (docket entries 1-4); see also KPMG Agreement, supra note 26, 9 11 (the
Agreement "must be approved by the Court, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161 (h)(2)").
32 KPMG Agreement, supra note 26,
1 2.
13 Id. $13; see also Mark W. Everson, Comm'r, IRS, Statement Regarding KPMG
Corporate Fraud (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=146998,00.html
(noting importance of "blue chip firms like KPMG that, by virtue of their prominence, set the standard of conduct for others").
31See KPMG Agreement, supra note 26, 91
6.
3'

3

Id.

9116.
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vital to "help prevent such wrongdoing in the future."' The Guidelines, as discussed below, require a comprehensively defined series
of compliance protocols, risk analysis, training programs, and auditing.
Beyond those efforts, KPMG created "a permanent compliance
office and a permanent educational and training program relating
to the laws and ethics governing the work of KPMG's partners and
employees."37 The program paid "particular attention to practice
areas that pose high risks."38 The agreement added that whistleblowers shall be protected and rewarded, a hotline shall be created
to report noncompliance, and "KPMG shall take such additional
personnel actions for wrongdoing as are warranted."39 Further, the
agreement mandated that "KPMG shall take steps to audit the
Compliance & Ethics Program to ensure it is carrying out the duties and responsibilities set out in this Agreement."' Thus the
compliance program itself was to be evaluated so that compliance
efforts would be continually improved. Such data collection tasks
KPMG with not only detection of employee wrongdoing but also
predicting and preventing future criminality among employees.
Overseeing these efforts, the agreement required KPMG to
permit the DOJ to appoint an "independent monitor" to serve for
three years.' Richard Breeden, a former SEC Chairman, received
the appointment (he previously served as a special master overseeing SEC compliance at MCI/WorldCom). Once his term expired,
the IRS then was to monitor KPMG's tax practice for two more
years. 2
Breeden was empowered to "review and monitor KPMG's compliance with this Agreement," to "review and monitor KPMG's
maintenance and execution of the Compliance & Ethics Program,"
"Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Press Conference Regarding
KPMG
Corporate Fraud
Case (Aug. 29, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/082905agkpgmcorpfraud.htm.
16.
38 KPMG Agreement, supra note 26,

Id.

3

Id. KPMG then created and described on its website a 24-hour whistleblower
website and telephone hotline for employees. See KPMG's Ethics and Compliance
Hotline,
http://www.us.kpmg.com/news/index.asp?cid=2012 (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
40
KPMG Agreement, supra note 26, 16.
" See id. 18(e)(I). Up to two additional years may be added to the Monitor's term
if,4in
2 its sole discretion, the DOJ finds KPMG breached the agreement. Id.
1Id. 19.
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and to "recommend such changes as are necessary to ensure conformity with the Sentencing Guidelines and this Agreement, and
that are necessary to ensure that the Program is effective." 3 To accomplish those broad ends, he was invested with sweeping powers,
such as unrestricted access to information, including any correspondence or email of KPMG employees, and inquisitorial powers,
including the right to call a meeting or interview any KPMG partner, employee, or agent.44 In addition, "[t]he Monitor shall have the
authority to employ legal counsel, consultants, investigators, experts, and any other personnel necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the Monitor's duties."45 Furthermore, "[t]he compensation and expenses of the Monitor, and of the persons hired under
his or her authority, shall be paid by KPMG."4 The Monitor had
the authority to "take any other actions that are necessary to effectuate his or her oversight and monitoring responsibilities."47 Neither the KPMG Monitor's reports, nor any of its other actions,
have been made public.
In addition to the ways it reshaped corporate governance within
KPMG, the agreement had substantial effects on nonparties. Nineteen individual employees and former KPMG tax partners face
criminal charges and must argue that KPMG's admissions that the
relevant tax shelters were illegal and intended to assist clients in
breaking the law should not prejudice them or constitute a finding
as a matter of tax law. ' Further impeding their defense (and empowering their prosecution), the Monitor may interview any current employee for any reason."
Several of those employees filed motions complaining that the
DOJ pressured KPMG to decline to pay for their criminal defense
as part of its effort to show its cooperation. District Judge Lewis
Kaplan ruled that the DOJ unconstitutionally pressured KPMG to
cut off legal defense payments, and though the indictments would
4'Id. T 18(a).
"Id. T 18(b).
' Id.
18(c).
6Id. 18(e)(VI).
41 Id.
18(d).
41 See Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Superseding Indictment of 19 Individuals
Filed in KPMG Criminal Tax Fraud Case (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2005/October/05 tax_547.html.
" KPMG Agreement, supra note 26, 18(b).
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not be dismissed, the defendants could file ancillary civil actions for
reimbursement.' Judge Kaplan, mincing no words, decried the
power the DOJ exercises in organizational cases, stating:
Justice is not done when the government uses the threat of indictment-a matter of life and death to many companies and
therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security of blameless employees-to coerce companies into depriving their present and even former employees of the means of defending
themselves against criminal charges in a court of law. 5'
Judge Kaplan's rulings have continued to raise important issues for
scholars to consider concerning the effects of these far-reaching
agreements on employees. For example, Judge Kaplan recently excluded certain proffer statements made by two employees of
KPMG as involuntary, ruling that the employees cooperated with
prosecutors due to the threat that KPMG would not pay their legal
fees, which was itself the product of government coercion.52 Again
using strong language, Judge Kaplan complained that by "altering
the manner in which suspected corporate crime has been investigated, prosecuted, and, when proven, punished," federal prosecutors have used "the exertion of enormous economic power by the
employer upon its employees to sacrifice their constitutional
rights."53
The KPMG agreement may also have industry-wide effects.
Given KPMG's prominence in the industry, any reforms adopted
by the Independent Monitor may become established "best prac-

o See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-4358 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2006).
5
,Id. at 381-82 (footnotes omitted).
52 See United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ruling
that while some employees did not offer evidence that they cooperated due to coercion, two offered "compelling" evidence that their proffers were the product of coercion).
13 Id. at 337. Judge Kaplan also noted "more than a little tension" between two
DOJ
lines of argument: while the DOJ argued that these statements were uncoerced by the
government, it simultaneously took the position that employees who make false
statements to private attorneys representing their employer under investigation and
cooperating with the DOJ may be obstructing justice. Id. at 337 & n.114.
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tices" in the industry. The Monitor may thus wield tremendous influence."

The agreement may also create industry-wide effects in a regulatory manner. The agreement includes detailed factual findings regarding the criminality of particular tax shelters that had not previously been found illegal by a court nor been made illegal by an IRS
regulation. Some tax experts predict that, using those stipulated
findings, "[t]he IRS and Justice Department will attempt to use
KPMG's admissions as evidence in litigation with taxpayers on the
merits of the shelters." 5 In that sense, the agreement does an end
run around time-consuming notice and comment rules." More
broadly, the process through which the agreement was reached reflects a collaborative approach by the DOJ, where the IRS was intimately involved from the investigation stage to the drafting and
implementation of the agreement.
A different kind of effect on industry may also have been considered in negotiations between KPMG and the DOJ. Proceeding
to trial against KPMG, a "big five" accounting firm (already reduced to a "big four" by the Andersen prosecution), might have
weakened the accounting industry, which the DOJ counts on to
audit corporations to prevent and detect corporate fraud. 57 Indeed,
KPMG provides consulting on corporate compliance issues, including on technology to improve compliance programs and auditing.58

"' See Scott D. Michel & Kevin E. Thorn, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Implications for Corporate Tax Departments, 58 Tax Executive 49, 53-54 (2006).
"5Id. at 52. The DOJ obtained similar factual admissions in the related German
Bank HVB deferred prosecution agreement.
56Raising additional questions regarding the KPMG tax shelters, nicknamed "Blips,
Flip, Opis and SOS," a newly discovered IRS document indicates that there was substantial debate within the IRS about whether such shelters had to be registered with
the agency. See Lynnley Browning, Document Could Alter KPMG Case, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 2006, at C1. Nevertheless, the government's case also relies upon other related frauds in addition to failure to register the shelters. See id. In an additional possible blow to the case, a federal judge in Texas ruled that the IRS cannot retroactively
apply 2003 rules regarding these tax shelters to prior conduct. See Lynnley Browning,
Judge Rules a Tax Shelter In KPMG Case Is Legitimate, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2006, at
C3.
" See Albert B. Crenshaw & Carrie Johnson, Regretful KPMG Asks for a Break,
Wash. Post, June 17, 2005, at DI.
58KPMG's website describes its corporate compliance consulting services, including
an annual "integrity survey" of compliance at firms nationwide. See KPMG Home
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KPMG had every incentive to fully comply to protect its business
in the compliance industry and to distance itself from wrongdoing
employees.
The agreement ended on December 31, 2006, at which point the
DOJ consented to the dismissal of the criminal information, stating
that "monitorship ...has been comprehensive and effective." 9 Up
until that point, the DOJ, in its sole discretion, could have found
that KPMG breached the agreement,' and in that case, the DOJ
could have added up to five years to the agreement term or, at its
option, pursued a criminal proceeding. This would have nearly certainly resulted in conviction because the DOJ could have made full
use of all statements and admissions by KPMG obtained in the
agreement and through KPMG's cooperation with the DOJ and
the Monitor. 6' The indictment was dismissed by the court on January 2, and shortly thereafter, the individual defendants filed motions with Judge Preska to intervene and appear as amicus curiae
to vacate the dismissal order.62 The court accepted the filings,
which were contradictory: one former employee argued that it was
against public policy to allow the prosecution to be terminated
given KPMG's actions, while a group of former employees argued
that the entire agreement should be rescinded and the fines returned, because the agreement provided the DOJ with unconstitutional power over KPMG.6 3 Judge Preska rejected those arguments, questioning whether the intervenors had standing as
nonparties to the deferred prosecution, noting that prosecutors
have exceedingly broad discretion when deciding to terminate a
prosecution, and affirming the dismissal of the indictment. 64 Now
that the charges have been dismissed, the monitoring continues for
two more years supervised by the IRS, and the DOJ still reserves
Page, http://www.us.kpmg.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2007); KPMG's Audit Committee
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
Institute, http://www.kpmg.com/aci/international.asp
" Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Statement on the Dismissal
of Charges Against KPMG (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/January07/kpmgdismissalstatement.pdf [hereinafter Dismissal Statement].
'o See KPMG Agreement, supra note 26,
10-12.
61 See id.
13.
62See United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:05-CR-00903-LAP, 2007 WL 541956
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2007).
63Id. at 8-9.
' 4 Id. at 14-16.
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the right to reinstate the charges or extend the time that the monitorship lasts should it determine that "KPMG has violated any
provision of the [Deferred Prosecution Agreement]."65
B. The Classic Civil Structural Reform Model
The KPMG example demonstrates the substantial power and
discretion prosecutors may exercise when, for the reasons just described, they choose to pursue structural reform against an entity
rather than an indictment or conviction. Structural reform refers to
injunctive relief seeking to reform an institution, and its origins
were in civil rights litigation. Stepping back several decades to take
a longer view of the origins of the model, the structural reform
ideal's recent ascendance in criminal law follows its metamorphosis
since the 1960s in civil rights law, reflecting shifts in policy goals of
government and the public.
In civil rights law, structural reform litigation rose to assume
central importance given a need for deep institutional change following efforts to end segregation in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education. As federal courts struggled to enforce decrees ordering
desegregation of schools, the school desegregation decree became
"[t]he prototype for the judiciary's new supervisory role" in the
1970s as the model was then extended from schools to diverse areas such as prisons, medical care, public housing, disability assistance, and special education.' In his landmark article, Professor
Abram Chayes describes such efforts as fundamentally unlike traditional civil litigation "settling disputes between private parties
about private rights," but rather constituting a new form of "public
law litigation" involving multipolar disputes, institutional reform,
outside involvement of parties such as "masters, experts, and oversight personnel," and "a complex, on-going regime of performance
rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer." 7 In particular,

6"Dismissal Statement, supra note 59.
Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43, 44 (1979).
67Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1282, 1284, 1298 (1976).
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structural reform involved courts changing "the operation of largescale organizations."'
The legitimacy of the classic structural reform model in part was
analogized to the model of the prosecutor. Civil rights lawyers
were envisioned as "private attorneys general" that would define
and then vindicate the public interest,69 and were bolstered by statutes providing for attorney's fees to reward successful litigation
under that rationale."
Professors Chayes, Owen Fiss, and others argued that courts
would inevitably move toward broad structural reform litigation
and that in appropriate circumstances, judges should exercise great
discretion, decoupling the remedy from the contours of the constitutional right when designing and implementing a structural remedy.71 A new body of remedial law developed. As courts and special masters continued to seek the means to remedy problems like
school segregation, poor prison and mental hospital conditions,
and housing discrimination, new remedial norms took hold in each
particular context, which in turn helped to define the content of the
underlying constitutional rights."

As remedies matured during years of experience implementing
structural reform remedies, courts also limited the scope, duration,
and content of structural reform remedies. While the Court ini6 Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1979).
69See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing origins of the term "private attorneys-general"); Associated Indus. of New York State,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (first decision using the term); William
B. Rubenstein, On What A "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004).
'0The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); S.
Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4-5 (1976) (explaining the Senate's intent to shift fees to reward
civil rights lawyers acting as "private attorneys general").
7 See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 45-46 (1982); Fiss, supra note 68, at
21-22; William Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635 (1982); Donald Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1268.
72See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale
L.J. 87, 110-13 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 873-82 (1999); David Zaring, National Rulemaking
Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. Rev.
1015, 1040 n.122 (2004) (noting a path dependency in adoption of structural remedies
in certain contexts).
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tially held that district courts could exercise broad discretion in exercising equitable powers," during a decades-long period of retrenchment beginning in the early 1970s, the Court narrowed the
scope of available structural remedies] 4 The Court enacted justiciability limits specific to actions seeking injunctive relief;7 ' emphasized doctrines of federalism,76 comity, and local control;" urged
least restrictive remedies for civil rights violations;79 and encouraged lower courts to modify, narrow, and terminate consent decrees.7 Supreme Court Justices then disparaged overreaching in
structural reform remedies as "wildly ...intrusive,"9 leaving courts
"enmeshed in ...minutiae,"'" and "judicial overreaching... [that]
eviscerates a State's discretionary authority over its own programs
and budgets." 2 Particularly in school desegregation decisions, the
Court instructed lower courts to limit the boundaries of remedies
that departed too far from the scope of the constitutional violations

"See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) ("Once invoked, 'the scope
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad."') (citation
omitted); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown It), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); see also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some
Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 173,
178-79 (2003); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights
and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. 111.
L. Rev. 1199, 1209.
74See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & James Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection,
22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 261, 270-72 (2004); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 Yale L.J. 585, 587 (1983); Jeffries, supra note 72, at 113.
" See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (urging "restraint in the
issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the
States'
criminal laws").
76
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 53 (1971).
7'E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
7
1See,
e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83-90 (condemning, as beyond the district court's
remedial powers, a plan to desegregate Kansas City schools by inducing white suburban children to transfer voluntarily).
" Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
" Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (disapproving orders that "enmeshed
[lower courts] in the minutiae of prison operations").
"2 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 125, 131 (Thomas, J.,concurring); accord Lewis, 518 U.S. at
349 ("[Ilt is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.").
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and to terminate oversight when substantial compliance was obtained.83
The consensus account describes that as courts defined and limited the scope of remedies, the structural reform era passed, such
that "[t]here are no contemporary examples of bold, Brown-like
reformist judicial enterprises."' Scholars produced a substantial
body of literature critically examining concerns of countermajoritarian legitimacy, federalism, comparative institutional competence, and the need for coherent remedial limits for the classic
structural reform model.85
However, structural reform litigation still persists and succeeds
in new forms, such as in state courts, in challenges brought by opponents of affirmative action,' in areas governed by statutes," and
in areas in which plaintiffs and government share incentives to enter into experimentalist arrangements, such as in consent decrees
to resolve pressing public problems.' Rather than withering on the

See supra notes 79-80.
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops... It's
Still Moving!, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 143, 145 (2003); accord Resnik, supra note 73, at
193; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
Cornell L. Rev. 270, 295 (1989) ("Institutional reform litigation generally has decreased since the mid-1970s."); Russell L. Weaver, The Rise and Decline of Structural
Remedies, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1617, 1623-28 (2004).
" See, e.g., Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government (2003); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State
Reformers, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949, 951 (1978); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M.
Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 617, 630-36 (2003); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355, 1359 (1991); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the
Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Cal.
L. Rev. 1121, 1122-24 (1996).
Gilles, supra note 84, at 145-46.
7Statutes that permit injunctive remedies include the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2) (2000), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2000), and 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j) (2000) (permitting the Department of Housing and Urban Development to seek receivership of
troubled housing projects). Regarding the persistence of such litigation, see, for example, Zaring, supra note 72, at 1033.
' See Diver, supra note 66, at 70-75 (identifying where various institutional actors
have strategic incentives to cooperate in structural reform litigation); Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 92-98 (2001);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1019-20 (2004); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights
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vine, the structural reform model instead adapted as it was reshaped by judicial review, political realities, and practical difficulties in implementation.
An emerging consensus regarding an "industry standard" or set
of "best practices" was central to the development of each area
where structural reform remedies were pursued. These practices
then provided a template for attorneys, institutions, experts, and
courts." Early disputes over the scope of remedies led to experimentation until settled practices emerged that organizations could
rely on to structure their own governance and avoid litigation.
Thus, over time, not only did courts limit and clarify structural reform remedies, but a consensus emerged regarding a defined set of
the most effective remedial practices.
The new and previously unexamined brand of structural reform
litigation developed by prosecutors shares the ambitions, though
not the form, of the Chayesian model.'0 The KPMG example illustrates how in structural reform prosecutions it is prosecutors, and
not courts, who serve as the chief decisionmakers and create the
clearinghouse for "multilevel" bargaining among parties and regulators. 1 This structural reform litigation remains unsaddled with
the history of civil rights litigation and the remedial limitations that
federal courts elaborated to rein in private litigants seeking to reform public institutions. Here the paradigm is somewhat reversed,
with federal, public actors seeking to reform private institutions
(though also several local public institutions). The relevant "rights"
being vindicated are also of a very different character. Prosecutors
bring this modern wave of structural reform litigation in response

Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 550, 554-55 (2006).
" See Garrett & Liebman, supra note 74, at 300-03; supra note 88; see also John C.
Jeffries & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 Cal. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2007); see generally Zaring, supra note 72.
Abram Chayes did briefly note in his seminal article that "securities fraud and
other aspects of the conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations,
union governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management-cases in all these fields display in varying degrees
the features of public law litigation." Chayes, supra note 67, at 1284.
" See Diver, supra note 66, at 64-67, 77 (discussing civil structural reform litigation
as a bargaining process with the judge acting as a power broker between the parties);
Sabel & Simon, supra note 88, at 1019.
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to organizational crime and as government actors tasked with defining law enforcement goals.
Structural reform in criminal cases, at first blush, appears impossible. Injunctions are not technically available in criminal law. The
common law rule since the demise of the Star Chamber has been
that "equity will not enjoin a crime.",92 Only where a legislature au-

thorizes it by a civil statute, such as in the RICO statute or federal
fraud statutes, may courts enter civil injunctions.93 As I discuss in
Part II, civil RICO labor racketeering cases dating back to the
early 1980s provide an important early civil model for the recent
structural reform prosecutions, with similar provisions including
independent monitoring and compliance programs. Yet even in a
criminal case, prosecutors may, during pre-trial diversion or plea
bargaining, impose injunctive conditions as alternatives to prosecution, just as courts do during probation. There is a long-standing
practice of adopting programs to defer and ultimately withdraw individual prosecutions so long as the defendants comply with certain
conditions; a federal statute permits deferral of prosecutions pursuant to written agreements.94 When extending that approach to
organizations, however, none of the well-developed limitations
placed on civil structural remedies necessarily apply. After all,
prosecutors are public attorneys general. Further, as the following
Section explains, not only do civil remedial limits not apply to
prosecutors, but their discretion, resources, and power in the
criminal system permit far more expansive remedies than are
available in civil cases brought by private attorneys general.
SEC v. Carriba Air, 681 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982). For some time, courts
could issue limited injunctions to prevent crimes to property or nuisance. See United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694 (1993); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593-94 (1895). The
Supreme Court later insisted that jury trial rights be provided during contempt proceedings and rejected "standardless" injunctions deeming behavior a public nuisance.
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000) ("The district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by
");James M. Fischer, Understanding Remedies § 27
issuing appropriate orders ....
(1999) (describing modern "legislative supremacy" approach to enjoining criminality).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2000); infra note 166. Prosecutors have pursued deferred prosecution in individual cases dating back to the "Brooklyn Plan" agreements
with first-time juvenile offenders in the 1930s. See, e.g., Stephen J. Rackmill,
Printzlien's Legacy, the "Brooklyn Plan," A.K.A. Deferred Prosecution, Fed. Probation, June 1996, at 8, 8-15; see also infra notes 207-08.
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C. Alternatives to Structural Reform Prosecution

The DOJ need not have pursued structural reform in the KPMG
case, nor did it often pursue structural reform in the past. Unlike
civil plaintiffs in the traditional structural reform litigation just discussed, prosecutors, federal prosecutors in particular, operate with
broad and often nearly unfettered discretion that provides them
with enhanced status in our criminal system." Prosecutors are
tasked with seeking justice in the criminal system by defining the
state's enforcement goals and deciding when to prosecute those
they deem deserving of criminal sanction." The DOJ can pursue
convictions or not prosecute organizations at all. This Section explores those alternatives to shed light on the dilemmas raised by
organizational prosecutions and why, in response, the DOJ decided
to pursue structural reform.
1. ProsecutingAll Organizations

Rather than pursue structural reform, first, the DOJ could
prosecute organizations to obtain deterrent fines. Following deterrence theory, which provides an economic justification for corporate criminal liability, prosecutors should seek to impose an optimal punishment based on the harm and the probability of

'5See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A
Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 550, 563-64 (1978); Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1252-59 (2004); see also United States v.
Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The Department of Justice wields
enormous power over people's lives, much of it beyond effective judicial or political
review."). Whereas local prosecutors primarily enforce criminal violations, federal
prosecutors can often handpick their cases. The DOJ brings very few corporate
prosecutions and typically only in egregious cases. See Daniel C. Richman & William
J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual
Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 608-12 (2005); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors
and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 758-67
(2003) (describing the structure and discretion of U.S. Attorneys' Offices).
" See Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function & Defense Function
Standard 3-1.2(c), at 4 (1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict."); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor ... is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
809, 843-47 (2000); William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering. 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1083, 1090, 1123-25 (1988).
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detection of the malfeasance.9' In individual cases, by way of contrast, the DOJ now pushes for the most severe punitive sentence
and does not seek leniency.98 If punitive fines were imposed, organizations could then rationally decide what socially efficient
compliance measures to pay for. An important reason for a finesoriented approach is a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating
whether structural reforms such as compliance programs create effective remedies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, industry regulators, and
now the DOJ emphasize such reforms. Yet scholars raise important questions about whether compliance programs have utility,
whether the move to excuse criminal liability may simply reward
"cosmetic compliance, '"" and whether firms may claim "good corporate citizenship" in order to shift blame to lower-level "wayward" employees.1" All of those concerns suggest cause for skepticism regarding the current legislative, regulatory, and prosecutorial
focus on compliance, and, in particular, these questions should be
further explored now that the DOJ emphasizes compliance in organizational crime prosecutions.
To be sure, scholars point out that if prosecutors did seek punitive fines, firms might still be reluctant to adopt optimal precautions in response because doing so could also mean detecting and
making a record of misconduct for which they could then be held

' See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 874-75 (1998); see also Guido Calabresi, The Costs
of Accidents 26-30 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 165 (2d ed.
1977); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
Geo. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (explaining principle of optimal deterrence).
'8The DOJ more recently has added guidelines that prosecutors should seek "the
most serious, readily provable offense" in individual prosecutions. Memorandum
from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-ag_516.htm.
" William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1415 (1999).
'oId. at 1343 ("Given equivocal evidence of compliance effectiveness, the rise of the
good corporate citizenship movement risks undermining the objectives and spirit of
the corporate criminal law."); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance
and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 504-05 (2003). For
a study suggesting that compliance programs can prevent misconduct, see Christine E.
Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Do Corporate Compliance Programs Influence
Compliance? 3-5 (Univ. of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 189, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=930238.
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liable."' Agency problems may also undercut the effectiveness of a
punitive fine." 2 Indeed, agency problems are exacerbated in the organizational crime context in ways that may explain why the DOJ
now focuses on compliance and not on optimal punitive fines. Two
features of federal organizational criminal law define the problem:
(1) minimal respondeat superior requirements, and (2) opentextured federal criminal prohibitions.
First, organizational prosecutions raise unique problems of overbreadth not present in prosecutions of individual criminals, due to
the fictional nature of such entities."'3 In criminal law, organizations
are treated as individual persons. For that reason, organizations do
possess some of the same protections as individual defendants. A
corporate defendant has the right to a grand jury, to a jury trial, to
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 4 However, unlike an individual,
an organization may be criminally liable for the act of a single
agent who violates a criminal law in the scope of employment and
with intent to benefit the corporation." That broad standard, in"'
See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?,
91 Geo. L.J. 1215, 1228-31 (2003); see also Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687,704-09 (1997).
,02
See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 101, at 690-91; Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1331, 1337 (2006).
,'See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind.
L.J. 473, 526 (2006); Coffee, supra note 20, at 407-10; Annie Geraghty, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 327, 338 & n.73 (2002); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 147981 (1996); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1350 (1999).
"4 See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1227, 1230 (1979); Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis 7-11 (Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 04-015,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=657441.
° See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909). Further, afterthe-fact approval of the agent's conduct, or ratification, can satisfy the scope and intent requirements. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958); see also United
States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that the agent's "acts
must be motivated-at least in part-by an intent to benefit the corporation");
Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 1-2 (approving of the conviction of a corporation
"despite its claim that the employee was acting for his own benefit, namely his 'ambitious nature and his desire to ascend the corporate ladder"' (citing United States v.
Automated Med. Lab., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985))). This twentieth-century de-
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tended to deter and to avoid issues of assigning responsibility
within complex firms, permits enormous exposure to acts 1of7
agents' and was drawn from tort principles of enterprise liability.
Critics have asked the DOJ to impose its own more restrictive respondeat superior standard. For example, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation recommends that the DOJ largely adhere
to its approach, but limit prosecutions only to "exceptional circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all offices and ranks. ' ' °"
Second, the criminal prohibitions for which organizations may
be held liable under those broad respondeat superior standards
remain notoriously vague. Congress enacted substantive criminal
law rules with open-textured prohibitions and reduced culpability
resembling civil standards for liability."° For example, broad federal criminal fraud statutes leave much to the interpretation of

velopment altered the common law rule that "[a] corporation cannot commit treason,
or felony, or other crime, in [its] corporate capacity: though [its] members may, in
their distinct individual capacities." William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *464.
" See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 23, 24 (1997) ("[T]here is often no distinction between what the prosecutor would have to prove to establish a crime and what the
relevant administrative agency or a private plaintiff would have to prove to show civil
liability."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev.
193, 246 (1991).
"07
By 1918, Judge Learned Hand observed "there is no distinction in essence between the civil and the criminal liability of corporations, based upon the element of
intent or wrongful purpose." United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y.
1918). On tort origins for enterprise liability, see George L. Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 465 (1985).
" Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 8, at 13. Of course, that standard
is entirely consonant with the DOJ's current Guidelines. See Memorandum from Paul
J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys 4
(Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speechl/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf. [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
9 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story
of the "Evolution" of a White Collar Crime, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1983);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1875 (1992); Lynch,
supra note 106, at 36-37; see also Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757, 760-70
(1999).
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courts and prosecutors, and many incorporate compliance with
regulations.'"
Thus, the DOJ can readily obtain convictions given broad respondeat superior liability and substantive criminal law. The DOJ
nevertheless rejected a deterrence approach in which it would have
sought convictions or punitive fines because of a different agency
problem: an indictment has such great collateral consequences on
the entire entity and also blameless employees, shareholders, consumers, and creditors."' Those collateral consequences include severe regulatory prohibitions such as debarment or revocation of licensing."2 Even for firms without extensive reliance on government
contracts or licensing, the reputational effects of an indictment,

'"'See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail fraud and wire fraud); see discussion in Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 469,475-76 (1996).
..See Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 12 ("[P]rosecutors may take into account
the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation's officers, directors, employees, and shareholders, many of whom may, depending on the size and nature (e.g.,
publicly vs. closely held) of the corporation and their role in its operations, have
played no role in the criminal conduct, have been completely unaware of it, or have
been wholly unable to prevent it."); see also Bruce Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal
Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 919-20 (1975).
'2 See Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 12 ("Prosecutors should also be aware of
non-penal sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension or debarment from eligibility for government contracts or federal funded programs such as health care."); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (1998) (providing for debarment
and suspension from government contracts or subcontracts during criminal prosecution). However, interestingly adopting a parallel structural reform approach, the debarment provisions permit excusing debarment if "the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in place at the time of the activity which
constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such procedures prior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debarment." 48 C.F.R.
§ 9.406-1(a)(1). Other factors relevant to the excusal of debarment include whether
"the contractor cooperated fully with Government agencies," and whether it adopted
any Government-recommended remedial measures. 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-1(a)(4), (7).
Examples of laws governing regulated industries that disqualify criminally prosecuted
firms include the following: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. H8 78o(b)(4)-(6), 78u(d)-(e) (2000); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (2000); Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. § 12a (2000); Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2) (2000);
Medicare and Medicaid Patients and Program Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7
(2000). See generally White Collar Crime Comm., Am. Bar Ass'n, Final Report: Collateral Consequences of Convictions of Organizations (1991); Andrew T. Schutz, Too
Little Too Late: An Analysis of the General Service Administration's Proposed Debarment of WorldCom, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1263 (2004).
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much less a conviction, may be severe.' As a result, prosecutors
face great incentives to avoid an indictment that can destroy a corporation and as a result harm employees, shareholders, and customers.
The overdeterrent effect of an indictment provided great impetus for the DOJ to resolve prosecutions pre-indictment at the
charging stage. A turning point for the DOJ was the Arthur Andersen LLP case. Andersen decided to go to trial rather than agree
to a deferred prosecution agreement because the terms gave so
' Andermuch "power and discretion to the Justice Department.."..
sen later sought bankruptcy in part because its conviction, though
later reversed, resulted in automatic debarment by the SEC and
inability to provide services to public corporations."5 The DOJ suffered great criticism following Andersen's collapse and has since
moderated its approach to explicitly take into account collateral
consequences in organizational cases."6 That said, the DOJ still
sometimes pursues indictments; the class action law firm Milberg
Weiss Bershad & Schulman was indicted after balking at a deferral
agreement. '17
Organizational prosecutions also impose special burdens on the
DOJ, further explaining the "cooperation dynamic.""' 8 Organiza,,See Buell, supra note 103 (providing analysis of the functioning and the role of
reputational sanction in organizational prosecutions); Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 329, 352
(1993) ("In some instances adverse publicity alone can cause corporate devastation.").
' See Richard B. Schmitt et al., Behind Andersen's Tug of War with U.S. Prosecutors, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at C1.
...
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005); Elizabeth
K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 107, 110 (2006). See generally 17 C.F.R § 201.102(e)(2)
(2005).
116 See Thompson Memo, supra
note 16, at 12-13.
117See Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law
Firm in Class Actions, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 2006, at Al (quoting the U.S. Attorney as saying, "We really had a
situation where the firm was not accepting responsibility, was not making any substantial changes to the firm itself. We really were in a situation where we had no
choice but to indict."). Milberg Weiss responded that the agreement would have required improper waiver of attorney-client privilege. See Milberg Weiss, Statement
Regarding Indictment (May 18, 2006), http://www.milbergweissjustice.com/
ourstatements.php.
"' See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 521, 526-29 (2004).
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tional prosecutions require a substantial investment due to their
complexity, the organizations' greater ability to conceal information, attorney-client privilege issues, access to very highly paid defense counsel, and the factual complexity of such cases. Perhaps for
those reasons, for decades federal prosecutors chose to prosecute
very few organizations."' It was not until 1999 that the DOJ issued
any document making transparent its approach to exercising discretion regarding organizations. That document, known as the
Holder Memo, was updated in 2001 in a memo by then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson known as the Thompson Memo,
and then slightly revised in the 2006 McNulty Memo.'2" Prosecutors
are instructed to consider whether prosecution is necessary at all or
whether civil or regulatory fines sufficiently punish and deter.'2'
The need for more formalized procedures may also be explained
by the acceleration in organizational prosecutions post-Enron, discussed next.
The DOJ has now firmly rejected an optimal deterrence approach to organizational punishment, and, as developed below, the
DOJ does not chiefly seek punitive fines in its settlements and emphasizes instead restitution to compensate victims. Nor could the
DOJ easily adopt optimal deterrence as its goal because the Sentencing Commission has already adopted Guidelines that reject optimal punishment and instead mitigate fines if a firm has "effective
compliance" programs.'22 Due to the Guidelines, even if the DOJ
aggressively pursued convictions, the resulting sentences might

..See Khanna, supra note 104, at 25-26.
2 See Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 13; McNulty Memo, supra note 108, at
17. Also, until the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in 1991,
fines remained low and civil awards might have had the greater effect. See Cindy R.
Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A. Cohen, Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J. Law & Econ. 393,
395, 409 (1999) (stating that before 1984, "the average fine was about $46,000," while
"[t]he mean criminal fine imposed on a publicly held firm increased from $1.9 million
pre-Guidelines to $19.1 million under the Guidelines").
,21See Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 13; see also Lynch, supra note 106, at 32.
22See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some
Thoughts About Their Future, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 205, 217-22 (1993) (describing the
Commission's conscious departure from the orthodox model of optimum deterrence,
finding it impossible to estimate with any accuracy or possibility of empirical support
the probability of detection of any particular crimes).
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look similar to the reforms already obtained in settlementsexcept for the terrible adverse collateral consequences of an indictment and conviction.
2. ProsecutingIndividuals Not Organizations

The DOJ could alternatively exercise the opposite option to not
prosecute organizations at all. Scholars have called for that result,
criticizing organizational criminal law as lacking a sound deterrence foundation. 23' They suggest outright decriminalization of organizational crime and greater reliance on individual criminal
prosecutions and regulatory enforcement.12' For reasons just discussed, organizations may not be able to efficiently prevent criminal acts by their agents. Prosecuting only individual wrongdoers
would continue to deter individual wrongdoing and do so without
subjecting the corporation and third parties to the enormous potential collateral costs of indictment. Prosecutors' expertise may lie
in prosecuting individual wrongdoers and not in reform of organizations or long-term implementation of structural remedies. '
A move to prosecute only individuals would also address concerns regarding the unfairness of organizational prosecutions to individual defendants by avoiding the situation where individual employees have the power of both the DOJ and the organization
arrayed against them. Although there is nothing unusual or impermissible about prosecutors seeking the cooperation of one defendant as against another in criminal cases, an organization is
See Epstein, supra note 11; supra note 20.
'24See Arlen, supra note 20; John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New
13

Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1466 (1982); Kraakman, supra note 20.
" Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, commented that "[f]or a prosecutor to get into the business of changing corporate culture is
skating on fairly thin ice." Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP, New York, New York, Corp. Crime Rep. (Corporate Crime Reporter, Wash., D.C.)
Dec. 12, 2005, at 48, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
maryjowhiteinterview010806.htm. Professor Coffee has similarly commented: "I don't
think prosecutors are particularly skilled in corporate governance." Janet Novack,
Club Fed, Deferred, Forbes.com, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/
kpmg-taxes-deferred-czjn_0824beltway.html. Similar criticisms are directed at civil
structural reform efforts. See Zaring, supra note 72, at 1040 n.122 (observing a path
dependency in remedial design and stating that "the Civil Rights Division regularly
enters into cookie-cutter consent decrees across jurisdictions").
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unlike the typical cooperator or informant in many respects. The
organization's cooperation provides the DOJ with employee records and documents, and, where privilege is waived, with attorney-client communications and work product. The KPMG case
raises the manner in which an organization can exert other pressures. Employees can face a difficult choice whether to cooperate
or lose their jobs and employer payment of legal bills. Future
scholarship should explore in depth the effects of DOJ agreements
on individual defendants.
Individual prosecutions, however, would not be nearly as easy to
mount absent cooperation of the entity itself. Given limited government resources and an organization's "often formidable resources," the DOJ significantly depends on the organization's cooperation to mount individual prosecutions, particularly where
documents and witnesses are in the organization's control.'26
Further, abandoning organizational prosecutions may have been
politically unrealistic for the DOJ, though this may change. As
noted earlier, in the past federal prosecutors only pursued organizational cases against very small organizations, but, as will be developed further in the next Part, the landscape changed after a
wave of large-scale corporate fraud. With the passage of SarbanesOxley, Congress gave strong direction to the Sentencing Commission, which in turn enhanced organizational sentences.'27 For the
DOJ to have simply ignored those directions and refused to prosecute a wide range of organizational crimes would have been a political nonstarter. Instead, the DOJ crafted an intermediate approach to prosecute only some organizations and to accommodate
interests of shareholders, third parties, agencies, and the public.
3. Deferring to Private Litigation and Regulators
As a third alternative approach, the DOJ could not prosecute at
all, instead deferring entirely to private civil litigation or regulatory
action. Doing so would greatly reduce the deterrent threat entities
may face, where, unlike in civil law, the "primary goals of criminal
law are deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation," and further,
where the costs of an indictment, much less a conviction, may be
2
127

Wray & Hur, supra note 17, at 1170-71; accord Brown, supra note 118, at 528-29.
See infra notes 143, 224-25.
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severe." The DOJ already defers to private litigation and explicitly
requires prosecutors to consider whether private civil suits would
suffice." 9 Arguments can be made that this deference should be
enhanced. If shareholders are the primary victims of failures by
management to adequately supervise agents, then the shareholders
can file a derivative suit; other victims can file civil tort or consumer fraud actions." The DOJ might enter into a settlement that
does not serve shareholder interests.' Adding to fear of collusion,
agreements before indictment raise similar concerns as early settlements in class actions."' On the other hand, prosecutors offer
advantages over private litigation. Unlike private attorneys, DOJ
prosecutors lack a financial stake in the outcome and do not incur
the transaction costs of attorney's fees.'33 In addition, the DOJ often seeks civil restitution that provides victims with a similar rem-

' Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 13.
See id. ("Although non-criminal alternatives to prosecution often exist, prosecutors may consider whether such sanctions would adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate a corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct.").
"0Regarding the deterrent threat of securities class actions, see Comm. on Capital
Mkts. Regulation, supra note 8, at 71 (describing how securities class action settlements increased sharply in value since the 1990s; in 2004, the DOJ secured $16.8 million in sanctions, or 2% of total securities enforcement, compared to over $3.1 billion
in SEC enforcement, or 30%, and $5.4 billion in private class actions, or 52.5% of enforcement); see also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47
Bus. Law. 461, 510 n.185 (1992); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 55, 60 (1991).
131 Not only may shareholders ultimately bear the cost that a prosecution incurs,
but,
raising a moral hazard problem, management may agree to incur suboptimal costs to
settle with the DOJ to avoid their own individual liability. See Coffee, supra note 20,
at 387 (calling this the "overspill" problem of corporate penalties); see also Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 97, at 948-49. DOJ actions do not involve multibillion dollar
settlements as in some blockbuster securities class actions. See Stanford Securities
Class Action
Clearinghouse, Top Ten List, http://securities.stanford.edu/
top-tenjlist.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (displaying ten securities class action settlements over $500 million).
"'See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1712-1715 (West 2006)
(requiring judicial scrutiny and approval of certain types of class action settlements);
see also S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7 (describing congressional concern with attorney collusion at the expense of the plaintiff
class).
33See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 8, at 79 (criticizing efficacy
of securities class actions in compensating victims).
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edy. Deferral agreements contain detailed admissions of wrongdoing that can empower civil plaintiffs.'34
Second, the DOJ currently defers to administrative agency enforcement, and arguments can be made that they could do so to a
greater degree. Agencies can pursue a wide range of civil remedies,
from forfeiture to fines, restitution, and injunctive remedies.'35
Agencies not only often detect the underlying crimes in the DOJ's
cases, based on their own public reporting regimes, but they have
specialized expertise. Agencies may also better protect third parties and the public; in contrast to a largely secret exercise of prosecutorial discretion, several federal agencies must permit notice and
comment from the public before they enter into consent decrees
regarding certain federal statutes.'36 Further, in civil actions filed by
agencies, third parties potentially affected by a consent decree may
often participate in a fairness hearing conducted before the decree
is approved.'3 7
These advantages of agency action explain why in all but a few
cases the relevant agency already handles the litigation. Agencies
only refer serious cases to the DOJ, and the DOJ explicitly considers whether a prosecution is a necessary supplement to pending
agency action before asserting jurisdiction. ' Indeed, regulatory
" An issue for future exploration is whether DOJ actions could undermine civil
suits. A proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence would make clear
that a corporation may selectively waive privilege only for cooperation with the DOJ,
preventing civil plaintiffs from making use of material uncovered. Report of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 5 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf (proposing addition of Fed. R. Evid. 502(c)).
' See Lynch, supra note 106, at 27-31.
"'See, e.g., Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2006) (FTC
consent orders); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(3)(B) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 22.45 (2006) (Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") public notice requirements); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(d)(2) (2000).
'3See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
529 (1986) (describing third party right to participate in fairness hearing).
,3See Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 3 (including an entity's efforts to "cooperate with the relevant government agencies" in the list of factors prosecutors should
consider in determining whether to charge a corporation); id. at 7 ("[T]he Department, in conjunction with regulatory agencies and other executive branch departments, encourages corporations, as part of their compliance programs, to conduct internal investigations and to disclose their findings to the appropriate authorities.
Some agencies, such as the SEC and the EPA, as well as the Department's Environmental and Natural Resources Division, have formal voluntary disclosure programs in
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agencies including the SEC have adopted parallel approaches also
emphasizing self-reporting, disclosure, and compliance. "9 Further,
the DOJ continues to coordinate and collaborate with regulatory
agencies during the implementation of its deferral agreements."
The DOJ's added value may be that in unusually serious cases, it
can secure cooperation using the deterrent threat of indictment.
As this Section has explained, the DOJ chooses to pursue structural reform settlements rather than indicting and convicting
(which would impose grave collateral consequences), or prosecuting only individuals (which would pose practical difficulties absent
the entity's cooperation and would ignore the DOJ mandate to enforce organizational criminal law), or deferring more to private
litigation and regulators (which the DOJ does, except in serious
cases where agencies refer cases to the DOJ for the added deterrent of a criminal prosecution). The next Part develops in greater
detail the decisions that shaped the DOJ's structural reform approach and provides a richer empirical description of that approach.
II. THE DOJ's NEW MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
PROSECUTION

Like the explosion of public interest law firms in the late 1960s
and early 1970s pursuing structural reform, the DOJ has now consciously adopted a structural reform litigation strategy in the wake
of Enron and dozens of other high-profile corporate malfeasance
which self-reporting, coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may qualify
the corporation for amnesty or reduced sanctions.").
139The SEC's Seaboard Report closely resembles the DOJ's McNulty and Thompson Memos in its approach. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969,
76 SEC Docket 296 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm [hereinafter Seaboard Report] (asking, among the factors
informing SEC discretion, "[d]id the company adopt and ensure enforcement of new and
more effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of the
misconduct?"); Information Memorandum from Susan L. Merrill, Executive Vice
President, Div. of Enforcement, N.Y. Stock Exch., to All Members, Member
Orgs. & Chief Operating Officers 2 (Oct. 7, 2005), http://apps.nyse.com/
commdata/PublnfoMemos.nsf/0/85256FCB005E19E8852570920068314A/$FILE/
Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Document%20in%2005-77.pdf; see also infra note 163.
10 See infra Section II.B.
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scandals.'4 ' A structural reform paradigm is different from the traditional role of prosecutors, which focuses on seeking convictions.
Further, although prosecutors have previously pursued institutional reforms in several contexts, the DOJ has recently fixed upon
one model for its recent structural reform litigation: the deferred or
nonprosecution agreement, secured at the charging stage, far earlier than in typical negotiations that occur during plea bargaining
after an indictment.
The DOJ's new structural reform prosecutions have been
brought in a range of areas, from securities fraud, to environmental
cases, to foreign corrupt practice cases. These disparate efforts
have not been viewed as sharing a common project, whereas on the
civil side, institutional reform interventions in schools, police departments, and prisons have been considered as part of a common
reform agenda.'42 In this Part, I describe in greater detail the DOJ's
adoption of a strategy at the charging stage resulting in a recent
wave of high-profile settlements. I then provide empirical analysis
of the terms of these agreements to develop a richer picture of
what the DOJ seeks to accomplish. Second, after describing the
charging stage approach that the DOJ decided to adopt in pursuing
structural reform, I frame the different ways prosecutors could obtain structural reform at other stages in a criminal case. The prevention, charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing stages each involve progressively greater court supervision, and, as a fifth
alternative, prosecutors could seek civil consent decrees. Though
the DOJ can pursue structural reform using any one or a combination of these approaches, this discussion will shed light on why the
DOJ chose instead to seek structural reform early in a criminal
case, at the charging stage, where prosecutors have particularly
broad discretion.
A. The Making of the DOJ's StructuralApproach
The Department of Justice now operates at the center of a program chiefly seeking reform of private corporations (though also
targeting a few public entities) engaging in such crimes as criminal
white collar fraud, money laundering, securities fraud, tax viola,4'See Blum, supra note 22.
42 See supra Section I.B.
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tions, foreign corrupt practices, health care fraud, and environmental crimes. In the past several years, corporate culture has been
scrutinized in the wake of the recent "epidemic" of accounting and
financial malfeasance. Congress responded to the crisis with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which relies on both enhanced criminal penalties and regulatory reform of governance to create "internal controls" to prevent malfeasance.1 3 At the same time, the DOJ responded with a series of large-scale organizational prosecutions.
Only a negligible number have been convicted, however.'"
Instead, DOJ prosecutors have done something unprecedented.
In 2002, President George W. Bush created a DOJ Corporate
Fraud Task Force ("Task Force") to coordinate investigation and
prosecution of companies.145 A novel strategy emerged. Typically
only in cases involving small organizations do federal prosecutors
still proceed to trial, though in exceptional cases they still prosecute. Far more than ever before, the DOJ avoids trial by entering
into pre-trial diversion agreements, permitting organizations to
commit to a rehabilitative program, and agreeing to defer prosecution should they comply. Such agreements are signed at the charging stage, after filing a criminal complaint but without an indict143The

Act, among its provisions, creates new offenses for destruction or falsifica-

tion of records with intent to obstruct federal investigations, requires accountants to
maintain audit documents, creates independent audit committees within corporations,
requires companies to report on their "internal controls," and, finally, establishes an
independent Public Accounting Oversight Board. 15 U.S.C.A. 78j-1(m) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7241(a), 7245(1), 7262 (Supp. IV 2004); see Coffee,
supra note 7, at 336, 353-64; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005).
" In the past few years, only two large firms per year have been sentenced. See U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 108 tbl.54
(2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/SBtoc03.htm [hereinafter
2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics] (only two of ninety organizations
sentenced in fiscal year 2003 had more than five thousand employees; eighty-six had
fewer than two hundred employees, with approximately half in firms of fewer than
ten employees); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2004 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics 124 tbl.54, 330 tbl.54 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2004/SBtocO4.htm [hereinafter 2004 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics] (only two of sixty-nine organizations sentenced in 2004 had more than five
thousand employees; sixty-two had fewer than two hundred employees, with approximately half in firms of fewer than ten employees). The Milberg Weiss indictment
is one of the few reported indictments of a large firm since Andersen. See supra note
117.
145 See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2002).
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ment."4 The numbers are accelerating. While no more than two
such agreements a year were reported before 2003, there were four
such agreements in 2003, eight in 2004, ten in 2005, and thirteen in
2006.
This change can be attributed to a new approach announced in
January 2003 by the then-head of the Task Force, Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson, in a document known as the Thompson
Memo.147 The Memo recommended "granting a corporation immunity or amnesty or pretrial diversion.., in exchange for cooperation" when that cooperation "appears to be necessary to the public
interest.' 14' Not only was "pre-trial diversion" for corporations a
fairly new concept, but the Memo did not suggest when the "public
interest" might be served by not prosecuting a corporation in exchange for an agreement. The Memo did, however, set out factors
to provide guidance as to when the DOJ should prosecute. They
include: (1) the nature, scope, and pervasiveness of wrongdoing,
(2) the history of misconduct, (3) timely and voluntary disclosures
and cooperation with the investigation (versus "circling the wagons"), (4) remedial actions taken, including disciplining wrongdoers, (5) whether the company has an adequate compliance program, (6) collateral consequences to shareholders, pensionholders,
and employees, and (7) the adequacy of individual prosecutions or
civil and regulatory remedies. 49
The heart of the Thompson Memo approach is the fifth factor,
emphasizing compliance in the DOJ's exercise of discretion and in
the design of remedies. The approach creates, in effect, a "due diligence" defense for corporations.' 0 Corporations that adopt an
14 See Corporate Crime Reporter, Crime
Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred
and Non Prosecution Agreements (2005), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
deferredreport.htm ("[P]rosecutors have entered into twice as many non-prosecution
and deferred prosecution agreements with major American corporations in the last
four years .... ).
"' See Thompson Memo, supra note 16. Generally, the DOJ suggests prosecutors
enter into deferred prosecution agreements when "the person's timely cooperation
appears to be necessary to the public interest." U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States
Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.600 (2d ed. 2000).
'Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 6.
14 Id. at
3-4.
""See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, supra note 104, at 1258 (1979) (advocating a due diligence defense in federal criminal law to modify respondeat superior).
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"adequate compliance program" may avoid prosecution. Of
course, a central concern of the DOJ is to screen out "cosmetic
compliance" programs.' Organizations, including large organizations, have been adopting compliance programs for some time.152
As the DOJ well knew, Enron had a compliance program entitled
"Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence," which despite the lofty title existed only on paper. "3 The Thompson Memo
guidelines counsel that prosecutors investigate whether compliance
efforts are implemented effectively.' Further, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission adopted guidelines mitigating punishment but only
where organizations develop "effective" compliance programs.'
The DOJ now seeks to use prosecution in egregious cases to leverage compliance on a "massive scale" and provide "a force for
positive change of corporate culture."'56 In keeping with its new
mission, the DOJ has obtained deferred or nonprosecution agreements with thirty-five companies, many of which are leading Fortune 500 companies. These agreements resulted in $4.9 billion in
fines and restitution as well as sweeping compliance reforms.'57 The

,' See Krawiec, supra note 100.
152 See, e.g., Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990's: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. Bus. Ethics 283, 285-86 (1999).
153 See Enron
Corp., Code of Ethics 4 (2000), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
enron/enronethicsl.html; Public Hearing Held by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 60 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phl1l-02/plenaryl.pdf.
1. The Thompson Memo states: "[i]n evaluating compliance programs, prosecutors
may consider whether the corporation has established corporate governance mechanisms that can effectively detect and prevent misconduct." Thompson Memo, supra
note 16, at 10; see also Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys para. VII(A) (June 16, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (noting that the mere "existence of a compliance program is not sufficient").
"' See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2005), discussed infra Section
III.B.
116Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 1 ("[C]orporations are likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is indicted for criminal conduct that is pervasive
throughout a particular industry, and thus an indictment often provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.").
,51See infra Appendix A; infra Section II.B.
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DOJ has also declined prosecution of organizations in part because
they maintain "effective" compliance programs. '
The DOd's approach in organizational crime cases has several
important progenitors in addition to civil structural reform efforts;
structural reform is not an entirely new goal for prosecutors.
Prosecutors beginning in the 1980s pursued long-term structural reform remedies in civil RICO cases that I describe in Section C below. The DOJ Antitrust Division adopted compliance-oriented approaches to criminal prosecutions decades ago, as have several
other DOJ divisions.5 9 Thus, federal prosecutors already had practical experience implementing institutional reforms. The DOJ's
current approach also has origins dating back to compliance approaches adopted in the 1970s by a series of federal regulatory
agencies." ' States have more recently adopted parallel strategies to
"8See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 27 n.107 (2003) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee
Re 0rt ] (citing examples).
While the Thompson Memo generally governs all criminal prosecutions, divisions
within the DOJ adopted earlier compliance-based strategies in division-specific areas
ranging from antitrust to environmental enforcement to civil rights. The DOJ's Antitrust Division adopted a "Corporate Leniency Policy" in 1978. The policy was revised
in 1993 to focus on compliance. See Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/0091.pdf. Similarly, the DOJ's Environment & Natural Resources Division
adopted an approach rewarding compliance and voluntary disclosure. See Env't &
Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecution
for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (July 1, 1991), http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
ElectronicReadingRoom/factors.htm. In the area of police misconduct, in which the
DOJ may file civil suits for injunctive relief against local governments, the Civil
Rights Division at the DOJ has in recent years settled cases pursuant to Memoranda
of Agreements rather than consent decrees. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000): Matthew J.
Silveira. Comment, An Unexpected Application of 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Using Investigative Findings for § 1983 Litigation, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 601, 617 & n.73 (2004). The
DOJ also emphasizes voluntary settlement of ADA violations and mistreatment of
institutionalized persons in correctional facilities under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person Act. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Civil Rights Accomplishments (July 23, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03 crt 414.htm.
"'" Such agencies include the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the EPA, the Federal
Financial Institutions Regulatory Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
State Department, and the SEC. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Defense, Voluntary Disclosure Program Guidelines (2000); Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Regulatory Bull. No. 32-28, Thrift Activities Regulatory Handbook Update
§ 370, at 370.1-.2 (2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/7/74085.pdf; Publi-
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create "'incentives ...to implement compliance programs, ' ' ' 6, with
then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer having led the
way.162 The convergence in regulatory approaches amongst state
and federal actors continues. Since the DOJ issued its Thompson
Memo, still more regulatory agencies have enacted new policies
even more closely resembling the DOJ's approach."

cation of the [HHS] OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399
(Oct. 30, 1998); Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Dir., Office of Criminal Enforcement, U.S. EPA, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal
Enforcement
Program
(Jan.
12,
1994),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf
(known as
the Devaney Memo); Steve Herman, From the Assistant Administrator, Audit Policy
Update
(U.S.
EPA,
Wash.,
D.C.),
Jan.
1997,
at
1,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/newsletters/
incentives/auditupdate/spr1997.pdf; Interagency Policy Regarding the Assessment of
Civil Money Penalties by the Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory Agencies, 45
Fed. Reg. 59,423 (Sept. 9, 1980); see also Wray & Hur, supra note 17, at 1108-33 (describing the compliance approaches of each of these federal agencies in turn); supra
note 112.
161Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 158, at 35 (quoting Jeffrey M. Kaplan,
The Sentencing Organizational Guidelines: The First Ten Years, Ethikos & Corp.
Conduct Q., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 1, 2-3, available at http://www.singerpubs.com/
ethikos/html/guidelineslOyears.html).
162See Michael Bobelian, Companies Under Fire Often Decide to Settle to End
Problems Quickly, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29, 2004, at 1; Junda Woo, Self-Policing Can Pay
Off for Companies, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at B5. Perhaps most remarkable was a
global settlement of a dozen of the leading Wall Street investment banking firms with
the New York Attorney General, the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, and other
regulators, "mandating sweeping structural reforms." See Joint Press Release, SEC,
NASD, NYSE, NYSAG & NASAA, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
'6-These agencies include the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, EPA, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the SEC. See, e.g., Enforcement Advisory, Div. of Enforcement,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Cooperation Factors in Enforcement Division Sanction Recommendations (Aug. 11, 2004), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
files/enf/enfcooperation-advisory.pdf; Office of Foreign Assets Control, Dep't of the
Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 501.601-.606 (2006); U.S. EPA, Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery, Disclosure, and Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg.
19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000); Seaboard Report, supra note 139; Press Release, U.S. SEC,
Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm (noting that
for the SEC, the use of "very large corporate penalties" is comparatively recent); see
also Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 158, at 48 nn.189-94, 119 n.391; Wray &
Hur, supra note 17, at 1109-13, 1125-34 (describing SEC experience under the Sea-
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Finally, the DOJ has, in response to criticism from industry and
Congress, moderated its approach in two respects. The McNulty
Memo that superseded the Thompson Memo includes two brief
but important additions. It discourages prosecutors, except in unusual cases, from conditioning agreement on nonpayment of employee legal fees, and, second, discourages prosecutors from obtaining privilege waivers, requiring central DOJ approval of such
waivers."
B. Empirical Analysis of the DOJ'sAgreements
Judge Gerard E. Lynch and others have argued that as the best
solution for the problem of vast prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors should develop standards to constrain their discretion and to
provide clear notice to organizations.'6 In some respects that is
what the DOJ did when it issued its Thompson and McNulty
Memo guidelines. Nevertheless, no DOJ guidelines define what
remedies prosecutors should seek when they negotiate structural
reform agreements. Courts have statutory authority to approve de-6
ferral of a prosecution, but no court has rejected an agreement. 6
All have been approved without judicial modification. The DOJ's
remedial discretion could create substantial uncertainty among potential targets of prosecution. The agreements, for example the
KPMG agreement, show the vast power of the DOJ to achieve
structural oversight with a wide range of intrusive terms. Nevertheless, looking at the KPMG agreement alongside the others casts
them all in a different light.
board Report and describing post-Thompson Memo approaches by regulatory agencies).
'6'See

McNulty Memo, supra note 108, at 10-12.

See Lynch, supra note 106, at 64-65; infra note 320.
"See 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(2) (2000) (stating that the time to file an indictment is
tolled during "[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with
the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate
his good conduct"); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 14, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., No. 1:04-cr-00837-ILG (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/compassocagreement.pdf ("[T]he Agreement to defer prosecution of CA must be approved by the Court, in accordance with
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2). Should the Court decline to approve the Agreement to defer
prosecution for any reason, both the Office and CA are released from any obligation
imposed upon them by this Agreement, and this Agreement shall be null and void.").
'i"
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To determine whether or how the DOJ adopts any consistent
approach that would provide somewhat clearer notice to organizations, I compiled terms from deferred and nonprosecution agreements entered in federal organizational prosecutions. I separated
the agreements into two groups, before and after January 20, 2003,
the date of the Thompson Memo; as noted, the numbers of such
agreements began to sharply accelerate in 2003. I have included at
Appendices A and B charts of the main features of these deferred
prosecution agreements (DP's) and nonprosecution agreements
(NP's). I am confident that the thirty-five agreements identified include all of the agreements entered in the first four years since the
Thompson Memo was announced (and covering the entire period
until the McNulty Memo was adopted), and for that reason I focus
the analysis on that time frame.167 I provide this comprehensive
study of the DOJ approach both to better understand its features
and also to provide guidance to prosecutors, courts, and practitioners in future negotiations and litigation. The table below summarizes several central findings regarding post-Thompson memo
agreements.
Table 1: Post-Thompson Memo DOJ Agreements (Jan. 2003-Jan.
2007)
Independent
Monitor

Compliance
Program

Agency
Cooperation

Privilege
Waiver
Required

DOJ Can
Unilaterally
Terminate

21

24

23

20

29

66

57

83

Number of

agreements
Percentage
of the 35
agreements ,

60

69
I

I

_II

Overall, the compliance focus of the DOJ is clear. Of the thirtyfive agreements entered in the four years after January 2003,
twenty-one included Independent Monitors (sixty percent).
See infra note 326 on methodology. It is striking that thirty-five agreements have
been entered since 2003, while I have been able to locate only thirteen such deferred
organizational agreements in the years prior.
167
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Twenty-four of the agreements ordered compliance programs
(sixty-nine percent). However, far more of the agreements involved compliance programs than even this data illustrates. In ten
of the remaining eleven, the corporation had already implemented
a compliance program: in seven, the prosecutors recognized the organization had already taken sufficient steps to implement compliance measures;" in two, simultaneous compliance agreements
were reached with regulators; 69 and in one case, the company voluntarily imposed a compliance program. 70 Of course, we cannot
know from any of these agreements what other prior compliance
or acts the DOJ may have taken into account.

Those companies are AEP, AIG, AmSouth Bancorp, Micrus Corporation, PNC
Financial, WesternGeco LLC, and Williams Power Co. See infra Appendix A; see,
e.g., Press Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Commission Accepts $21 Million Civil Penalty to Settle Investigation of AEP's Natural Gas Activities (Jan. 26,
2005), http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/press-releases/2005/2005-1/01 -26-05-aep.asp
("Commission staff understands that the companies' new owners are not repeating
the improper practices."). In addition, the Healthsource agreement incorporated actions taken in response to an SEC settlement, and the MCI agreement recognized cooperation with the Oklahoma Attorney General. See infra Appendix A.
' 'The Adelphia and FirstEnergy Nuclear cases involved agreements with regulators. See Press Release, SEC, SEC and U.S. Attorney Settle Massive Financial Fraud
Case Against Adelphia and Rigas Family for $715 Million (Apr. 25, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-63.htm; FirstEnergy Nuclear Hit With Record Fine
for Reactor Damage, Env't News Service (Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.ens-newswire.com/
ens/apr2005/2005-04-22-04.asp (."Davis-Besse's performance has been closely monitored by a dedicated NRC oversight panel and the inspection staff."' (quoting Luis
Reyes, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Executive Director for Operations));.
see also infra Appendix A.
'7 The BankAtlantic agreement does not include or recognize compliance programs or
monitors, but the company issued a public statement that it had implemented substantial
compliance efforts. See Press Release, BankAtlantic, BankAtlantic Enters into Agreements
with the Department of Justice, Office of Thrift Supervision, and FinCEN Relating to Bank
Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Matters, http://phx.corporate-ir.netU
phoenix.zhtml?c=106823&p= irol-newsArticle&ID=847985&highlight (Apr. 26, 2006)
(quoting BankAtlantic CEO Alan B. Levan as saying, "we have worked tirelessly to
ensure we are in full compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money
laundering laws and regulations, and have made significant investments in personnel
and compliance systems").
The only firm left, the exception, is BAWAG, a foreign bank that was in the
process of being sold. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of N.Y.,
Austrian Bank "BAWAG" to Pay $337.5 Million for Restitution to Victims of
Refco Fraud (June 5, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/June06/
bagwagnon-prosecutionagreementpr.pdf.
6
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Thus, the DOJ appears to follow the Thompson and McNulty
Memo guidelines in emphasizing compliance, at least in the written
terms of the agreements. Some consistency would not be surprising
given that the Corporate Fraud Task Force coordinates the prosecution of these cases (and importantly ensures that the various U.S.
Attorneys' Offices do not issue competing or preemptive indictments in the same matter), but some inconsistency could also be
expected, given that the Task Force does not currently oversee
prosecutions, each U.S. Attorney's Office negotiates the agreements independently, and there is no requirement of central office
approval of their terms.'
The DOJ did not invent this approach from whole cloth. As
noted, it pursues compliance-based remedies similar to those of
regulatory agencies such as the SEC, Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), Treasury Department, Defense Department,
Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"), State Department, and the voluntary disclosure and cooperation regimes that DOJ Divisions and U.S. Attorneys' Offices
had earlier adopted, also mirroring the substantial innovations of
former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's complianceoriented approach."2
It should come as no surprise that my data shows sixty-six percent of these agreements were reached in conjunction with regulatory agencies, sometimes more than one in a given agreement. By
far the leading agency was the SEC, cooperating in fifteen agreements, followed by the U.S. Postal Inspection Services (eight), the
IRS (five), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (two),
and several other agencies that only cooperated in one agreement
(Treasury Department Inspector General, Nuclear Regulatory

' See Andrew Hruska, The President's Corporate Fraud Task Force, U.S. Att'y
Bull., May 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiareadingroom/usab5103.pdf (stating that the Task Force members "consult regularly with the prosecutors and investigators.., to coordinate the overall scope and
direction of the Department's effort to combat corporate fraud"); Wray & Hur, supra
note 17, at 1187-88 & n.407. Prosecutors in different districts use each others' work as
a template. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey "utilized the
work of other districts as a starting point and crafted the final document to fit the
facts of the case and the negotiations with Bristol-Myers." Christie & Hanna, supra
note 17, at 1049.
172See Wray & Hur, supra note 17, at 1107-08; supra notes 160-61.
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Commission, U.S. Air Force, NASA, and Diplomatic Security Ser-

vices).
Prosecutors also drew inspiration from the framework of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, rewarding corporations
with "effective" compliance programs.'7 Nevertheless, many of the
agreements fall short of the Guidelines' rigorous criteria for what
constitutes effective compliance; only five formally incorporate the
Guidelines requirements.
Twelve agreements were nonprosecution agreements, while
twenty-three were deferred prosecution agreements. Deferred
prosecutions must be approved by a court, as discussed further below. However, the terms of deferred prosecution agreements did
not vary significantly from those found in nonprosecution agreements. I discuss each category of provision in turn.
First and most prominent is the role of independent monitors.
Twenty-one of the thirty-five prosecution agreements entered since
the Thompson Memo required independent monitors. These monitors had sweeping powers to gather information, promulgate policies, and oversee compliance. As the U.S. Attorney for New Jersey
explains, "[a] strong, independent monitor is in a far better position to ride herd over a mammoth corporation than any U.S. Attorney's Office or Probation Office. Independent monitors are
visible, on-site reminders that compliance with the terms of a de' The
ferred prosecution agreement is mandatory, not optional."174
monitors do not report to a court, but report to the DOJ and perhaps also a federal agency. Further, none of the agreements provide that the reports of these monitors are to be made public (nor
does the DOJ take a position on whether the reports are privileged). The work of these monitors resembles the sort of internal
investigations by independent auditors that the DOJ increasingly
demands for cooperating entities."'

"'The Thompson Memo cites the Organizational Guidelines in several places. See
Thompson Memo, supra note 16, at 5, 7 n.2, 10 n.6. The Sentencing Commission then
returned the favor, citing the Thompson Memo as part of the reason why it strengthened its compliance requirements. See Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 158, at
119-20, nn.392-93.
7' See Christie & Hanna, supra note 17, at 1055.
175 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences
of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 111 (2003).
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The length of monitoring is often longer than the typical eighteen months for deferral agreements and can be as long as three
years. The average amount of time that these agreements last is
two years. A few specify that they can be extended if needed to secure compliance."6
The monitors may become involved in uncovering and remedying new criminality totally unrelated to the agreement. Demonstrating the power of these monitors, in the Bristol-Myers Squibb
case the monitor recommended that the Board dismiss the CEO
based not on failures related to the agreement deferring prosecution of securities fraud charges, but on a new criminal investigation
relating to a patent dispute.'7 7 However, as will be developed below, outside monitors may face difficulties gaining access to information and cooperation, particularly where they work with a limited staff and are charged with assessing a very large organization.
Second, all of the agreements either contain requirements to
create detailed compliance programs or to continue programs the
entity already created voluntarily. These compliance programs are
often sweeping, affecting both top management and low level employees. Some, because of the prosecution of key actors, inevitably
affect entire industries. Most require the creation of elaborate programs, including auditing, new policies, reporting systems, and
training.
As noted, only five agreements incorporate the Sentencing
Guidelines requirements for effective compliance programs.'78 The
other agreements often do not satisfy the Guidelines' seven criteria. For example, they do not specify that the compliance program
itself be audited to improve its effectiveness and do not specify involvement of high-level officials. Some also go farther than the
Guidelines in some respects, for example by requiring top-level
governance changes apart from the creation of a compliance pro76See

U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-22.010 (2d ed.

2000) ("The period of supervision is not to exceed 18 months."). The few deferral
agreements, such as the KPMG agreement, that specify that they can be extended if
compliance is not complete do not specify how that is to be judged.
,' See Stephanie Saul, Drug Chief May Lose His Job: Firing Is Urged at BristolMyers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2006, at C1.
"'The KPMG, Hilfiger, German Bank HVB, Mellon Bank, and Roger Williams
Medical Center agreements require creation of "effective compliance" programs as
per the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Appendix A.
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gram, including adding members to the Board of Directors of the
corporation and, in one case, DOJ approval of an independent di-

rector.171
Third, ten of the agreements include data-gathering efforts in the
compliance programs to enable monitors to better oversee compliance."' They do not, however, specify what measures the monitor
should use to quantify compliance.
Fourth, the agreements include provisions that require cooperation with the DOJ during investigations of individual employees or
former employees."' These provisions do not have time limits; they
state in very general terms that the organization has an obligation
to fully cooperate with the DOJ for as long as the DOJ continues
to investigate the underlying crimes. Some obligate the organization to cooperate should the DOJ uncover additional criminality.
Not only do the generic cooperation provisions contain sweeping
language, but the DOJ specifies certain types of cooperation, including access to documents and employees for interviewing. In effect, the organization serves as "an investigative partner" of the
DOJ. '"2 Such provisions also controversially include waivers of attorney-client and work-product privileges.
I note, though, that despite the controversy over a "culture of
waiver," ' and though the DOJ may also request waiver during investigations, in its agreements at least, the DOJ exercised some
79

'" See

Christie & Hanna, supra note 17, at 1052-53 (describing the Bristol-Myers
agreement requirement that two directors be appointed to the Board, one with the
approval of the U.S. Attorney's Office, and stating that the "aim was to bring fresh
blood and a new perspective to the board of directors; our preference for someone
with a law enforcement background was made clear").
""See infra Appendix A (showing that the Boeing, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Canadian
Imperial Bank, Computer Associates, and Operations Management International
agreements require data gathering, and that the KPMG, Hilfiger, German Bank
HVB, Mellon Bank, and Roger Williams Medical Center agreements require creation
of "effective compliance" programs under the Guidelines and therefore must comply
with the Guidelines' requirement that data be gathered to evaluate the effectiveness
of the compliance program itself).
"' There is one exception-the Hilfiger agreement does not require full cooperation
with the DOJ-but only because Hilfiger had already provided it.
,2See Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution Agreements:
What Is the Cost of Staying in Business?, Wash. Legal Found. Legal Opinion Letter,
June 3, 2005, at 1,2, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/060305LOLSklaire.pdf.
' See Am. Chemistry Council et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege
in the Corporate Context 2-3 n.7 (2006), http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf.
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underappreciated sensitivity. As my chart shows, the DOJ did not
seek privilege waiver in many of its agreements, though it did seek
privilege waiver in the majority, or twenty agreements (fifty-seven
percent). After the McNulty Memo, and in response to critics, the
DOJ may seek such waivers less frequently.
Fifth, the agreements often retained a key nonstructural element
typical of criminal law judgments-damages, with amounts ranging
from the thousands to the hundreds of millions. The total fines, restitution, and compensation paid as a result of the thirty-five agreements was $4.95 billion, with an average amount of $141 million
per agreement. This figure is only approximate because it includes
some payments secured not by the DOJ, but credited as separately
(or jointly) secured by regulatory agencies that cooperated in the
investigation. These ballpark figures do confirm that the DOJ has,
on average, pursued substantial cases involving relatively large
costs.
Nevertheless, many of the agreements chiefly require payments
of civil restitution only, rather than a punitive fine (including to
shareholder compensation funds), compensation to settle civil lawsuits, disgorgement, or payment of back taxes." The added punitive fine was often negligible.' A generous calculation of punitive
fines imposed provides a total of $670 million, or $19 million on
average per agreement, and only 14% of the total."8 Thus, the DOJ
does not seem to rely on fines for deterrence, but rather on civil
remedies such as restitution, disgorgement, and civil compensation,
with a small proportion of payment as fines. In so doing, the
agreements comport with the Guidelines' emphasis on providing
restitution to victims."n
" The Sentencing Guidelines prioritize payment of restitution. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 8B1.1 (2005); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (2000) ("[Tlhe court shall
impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to the extent that such fine or penalty
will not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution."); Christie & Hanna,
supra note 17, at 1059 (describing why the Bristol-Myers agreement did not include a
punitive fine).
"' As in civil structural reform cases, a structural reform remedy may cost far less
than a damages award (or, in a criminal case, a punitive fine). See Jeffries, supra note
72, at 107-10.
" This figure is certainly overstated; I counted as a fine the entire sum in several
cases (worth $63.5 million total) where, though naming a large damages payment, the
DOJ did not specify what part of the award was a fine and what part was restitution.
...
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B1.1.
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The overall approach requires comprehensive compliance programs, including independent monitors whose terms last for years,
detailed injunctive changes of policy and practice, training programs, auditing, data collection, cooperation with the DOJ, and
payment of restitution to victims. This is a real change from the
general features of the few known organizational agreements prior
to the Thompson Memo because previous agreements tended to
last for a short time and typically did not require compliance."
Given each of the reasons why prosecutors possess near overwhelming power to prosecute organizations, the adoption of a
more lenient approach, an "entente cordiale," is perhaps surprising. " Explanations already given include that prosecutors hope to
avoid the catastrophic collateral consequences of an indictment,
and also that settlement conserves DOJ resources, where organizational prosecutions are complex and firms can afford expensive and
experienced defense counsel. Prosecutors also claim that they
could not obtain such sweeping injunctive relief through courts." '
An additional explanation suggested by these agreements is that
prosecutors often confront situations in which the organization is
less blameworthy than individual employees. Prosecutors may confront two general types of organizations. If rogue employees can be
blamed for the criminality, then the interests of prosecutors and
the current leadership of the organization may be aligned. Both
may wish not only to reform the organization and punish those involved in criminality, but also take special care to avoid undue collateral consequences to blameless employees, shareholders, pension plans, and the public."' Thus, it is often defense lawyers
representing the employees being individually prosecuted that protest about the prejudicial effects of these agreements. 2 In cases
'm As illustrated in Appendix B below, about one-third of those agreements had independent monitors, most lasted for a short time or listed no duration at all, and approximately one-third required compliance programs.
"' See Joseph A. Grundfest, Over Before it Started, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2005, at
A23.
""See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
'"'See Blum, supra note 22, at 1 ("'Deferred prosecutions give a company the
chance to reform itself without creating a situation where a lot of people are going to
lose their jobs and a lot of investors are going to lose more money."' (quoting Timoth ' Coleman, Senior Counsel to Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Jr.)).
In the Computer Associates case, an attorney for the company called the agreements "an excellent way for prosecutors to satisfy their objectives without imposing
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where the current leadership of the organization shared a role in
the wrongdoing, however, reforms may require purging the leadership and fundamentally changing the organizational mission. Those
cases may not easily be settled, perhaps explaining the occasional
inability to reach agreements, such as in the Andersen and Milberg
Weiss cases, or more commonly in cases involving small firms.
Finally, the DOJ's own deterrence goals may be better served by
a system of narrow standards that provide enhanced notice. 93' I discuss the DOJ's exercise of prosecutorial discretion next.
C. Alternative Stages to Pursue StructuralReform Prosecutions
Prosecutorial discretion remains fundamental to the nature of
organizational prosecutions, and prosecutors, in the exercise of
their broad discretion, chose the structural reform alternative to
avoid the collateral consequences of indictment and conviction."'
Having chosen to seek structural reform, however, they have not
just one but a range of alternative means to that end. I divide the
exercise of a prosecutor's discretion into four stages chronologically: prevention, charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. As a
fifth option, prosecutors may seek parallel civil remedies. Further,
the prosecutor's choice of which stage to exercise discretion has
great significance. At each successive stage of the criminal process,
the nature of the discretion changes and courts further constrain it.
In addition, the DOJ could choose to pursue more than one of
these alternatives in a given case, such as by seeking a conviction
and parallel civil remedies. In this Section, I explore these alterna-

serious collateral consequences." Id. In contrast, an attorney representing a former
Computer Associates executive facing criminal charges objected to the decrees as
"undermin[ing] the adversarial system of justice." Id.
I" Few organizational prosecutions were brought before the Thompson Memo provided notice of the new approach. See supra notes 119-20, 146-49, and accompanying
text. The DOJ's current structural reform approach resembles the "benign big gun"
approach towards regulatory compliance and the "enforced self-regulation" developed in Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite's book. See Ian Ayres & John
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation 19 (1992).
" Regarding the problem of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in organizational
cases, see, for example, Lynch, supra note 106; Richman, supra note 109; William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 790-91
(2006).
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tive approaches to structural reform to shed light on what the DOJ
decided by selecting a charging stage approach.
1. The Prevention Stage
First, prosecutors may seek to achieve structural reform goals
without prosecuting at all. While prosecutions typically litigate in
response to specific reports of criminal activity, as a complement to
their traditional role, prosecutors sometimes also focus on prevention to influence primary behavior. For example, in individual
cases they may participate in early intervention programs to prevent youth violence, truancy, or drug use,' 9 or task forces that raise
public awareness, encourage voluntary reporting, hinder criminals,
and assist victims.' In organizational cases, the DOJ operates joint
task forces with other agencies in a range of areas in part to focus
on prevention. The Corporate Fraud Task Force, for example, allocates resources among federal and state agencies to develop capability to audit organizations and compliance procedures, encourage voluntary disclosures, and detect criminality.' 7 The Katrina
Fraud Task Force aimed to develop institutional ability to prevent
fraud directed at the $85 billion in Gulf region relief spending.'
Prosecutors may also impact industry significantly by announcing
their enforcement priorities, such as through memoranda like the
Thompson Memo or in speeches to the white collar bar.

' See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1465, 1473-80
(2002) (describing community outreach and violence-prevention efforts by prosecutors); James C. Backstrom, The Role of The Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy
in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 699, 712 (1999)
(listing examples nationwide of prosecutors' involvement in juvenile crime prevention
programs).
" For example, as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, a task force was
tasked in part with developing economic opportunities for potential victims of trafficking. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7103(d)(4), 7105(a)(1) (2000).
' 7 See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002); Corporate Fraud
Task Force, First Year Report to the President (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first-year-report.pdf. On the early roots of a problem
solving approach among prosecutors leading, for example, to the creation of the
DOJ's Organized Crime Section, see Ronald Goldstock, The Prosecutor as Problem
Solver (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
1"'See Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force, A Progress Report to the Attorney General
21 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/katrina/KatrinaFraud/docs/katrinareportfeb2006.pdf.
9
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Further, though federal prosecutors remain focused in their dayto-day work on investigations and prosecutions, they operate
against a regulatory background in which auditing and reporting
aim to prevent crime. Regulators have long promulgated policies
encouraging prevention-oriented reporting and auditing, and they
may prefer those approaches to prosecutions that can discourage
cooperation." A range of agencies have also adopted rewards for
voluntary disclosure, including the Department of Defense, EPA,
Federal Aviation Administration, HHS, SEC, State Department,
and Department of Labor.2" The emphasis on voluntary disclosure
increased in response to corporate governance scandals. With the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, with its elaborate reporting and compliance requirements, and then with the addition of SEC requirements, corporations face more onerous rules governing auditing
and compliance."' Prosecutors rely on these pre-existing disclosure
regimes to prevent crime. They coordinate training on those regulatory reporting requirements and then bolster those rules by investigating, along with agencies, noncompliance as an early signal
of possible criminalityy The net result may allow prosecutors to
rely on criminal sanctions only in egregious cases, but otherwise to
rely on self-reporting and prevention.
2. The ChargingStage
Second, having been made aware of alleged criminality, prosecutors decide whether or not to pursue charges and then what
charges to pursue. The DOJ now chooses to pursue structural reform in organizational cases at the charging stage. Particularly sigSee supra notes 139, 159, 163, and accompanying text.
See id.; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 17, at 1108-33.
201See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act anti-shredding provision); Dis199
20
'

closure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17
C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 249 (2003); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.10
(2004); Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57
Admin L. Rev. 757 (2005); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1209-20 (1999);
supra note 143.
See Larry D. Thompson, Introduction to Corporate Fraud Task Force, supra note
197, at iii, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first-year-report.pdf (describing
contributions of task force members, joint training efforts, policy initiatives, and enforcement); see also infra Appendix A, which shows that most agreements were negotiated in collaboration with regulators.
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nificant is that the charging stage occurs before indictment, and
thus the DOJ avoids the severe collateral consequences of an indictment to the organization. Also significant at the charging stage
is that prosecutors have considerable discretion. The Supreme
Court has held that the executive branch "has exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case."2"3
Prosecutorial exercise of discretion is generally unreviewable if the
prosecutor had probable cause, unless prosecutors rely on invidious characteristics like race or religion.2 " This "broad discretion"
stems from separation of powers and the President's power to
2 5 Prosecutors
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.""
may also publicly define charging guidelines or standards that,
though legally unenforceable, internally limit exercise of their discretion."' Further, at the charging stage, prosecutors may seek
permission from the court to "defer" prosecution in individual
cases pending an opportunity to complete a rehabilitative program.0 7 Typically only nonviolent or first time offenders are eligi23 United States v.
2WSee, e.g., Wayte

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974).
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("In our criminal jus-

tice system, the Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute."
(quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 598, 380 n.l (1982))), cited with approval in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
201 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; 28 U.S.C. §§ 516,
547 (2000) (reserving conduct of litigation to officers of the Department of Justice); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (noting
that prosecutors retain their broad discretion "because they are designated by statute
as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"'); United States v. Hicks, 693 F.2d 32,
34 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982).
21 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys'
Manual § 9-27.230 (2d ed.
2000) (defining charging standards using very broad factors such as "[flederal law enforcement priorities," "[tihe person's culpability," and "[tjhe nature and seriousness
of the offense"); see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2143 (1998) (calling for prosecutors to "declare the
standards by which" they decide "what cases to bring and not bring"). See generally
Thompson Memo, supra note 16; McNulty Memo, supra note 108.
207
Generally, federal prosecutors enter into deferral agreements when "the person's
timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest." U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.600; see also United States v. Richardson, 856 F.2d 644, 647 (4th Cir. 1988) ("A defendant has no right to be placed in pretrial diversion. The decision ... is one entrusted to the United States Attorney."):
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ble for deferral (or "diversion"), and if they agree to participate,
courts typically supervise such efforts in drug courts or other alternative courts.2 " The DOJ's more recent innovation was to extend
the practice of pre-trial diversion to organizations.' As developed
in the next Part, the discretion prosecutors receive at the charging
stage limits the ability of courts to review structural reform prosecutions.
3. The Plea BargainingStage
Third, prosecutors may choose to negotiate a plea bargain. Almost all individual criminal prosecutions result in guilty pleas. 1 '
Plea bargaining retains the same prominence in organizational
prosecutions; the overwhelming majority of organizations charged
plead guilty."'
Federal courts are more involved in reviewing plea bargains than
charging decisions, but judges still remain highly deferential.21
Judges examine voluntariness, factual basis, fairness, abuse of discretion, or infringement on the judge's sentencing power."3 Judges
Hicks, 693 F.2d at 34 n.1 ("Since pretrial diversion is a program administered by the
Justice Department, considerations of separation of powers and prosecutorial discretion might mandate an even more limited standard of review."); Thomas E. Ulrich,
Pretrial Diversion In The Federal Court System, Fed. Probation, Dec. 2002, at 30, 3133, 35.
21 See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment
and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1208-09 (1998) (describing the use of courts to
supervise drug treatment programs for nonviolent offenders).
09See supra Section II.A; infra
Appendix A.
210 See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324-25
(1999) ("Over 90% of federal
criminal defendants whose cases are not dismissed enter pleas of guilty or nolo contendere."); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics tbl.5.22 (2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t5222005.pdf (finding that in 2004 95.1% of individual defendants disposed of in
federal district courts pleaded guilty or nolo contendere); see also Rachel E. Barkow,
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1276, 1282-83 (2005).
211See 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 144,
at 107
tbl.53 (in fiscal year 2003, 182 of 200 organizations prosecuted plead guilty, with 18
proceeding to trial).
2 2
Nolo contendere agreements without an admission of guilt must be approved by
the court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(3) (requiring that the court evaluate nolo contendere pleas by considering "the parties' views and the public interest in the effective
administration of justice").
2,' See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("A court may reject a plea
in exercise of sound judicial discretion."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) advisory committee's
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may reject plea agreements "when the district court believes that
bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest., 24
However, plea agreements cannot be modified but can only be accepted or rejected.2 5 Once entered, both prosecutors and defendants are bound by plea agreements as contracts and may seek relief for any material breach.2 '
The DOJ has sometimes pursued guilty pleas combined with
compliance settlements. Before the Thompson Memo, the DOJ
occasionally sought structural reforms from corporations charged
with crimes and did so chiefly by securing plea agreements including injunctive reforms. The E.F. Hutton and the Drexel Burnham
Lambert cases in the 1980s were leading examples.2 7 More recently, for reasons discussed, the DOJ sought to avoid indictments
of large firms, preferring deferral or nonprosecution agreements.2 '
note ("The plea agreement procedure does not attempt to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement. Such a decision is left to the discretion of
the individual trial judge."); Lowell B. Miller, Judicial Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas, 63 Geo. L.J. 241, 246-47 (1974).
2,1 United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462
(10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 854-55 (D. Utah 1989) (holding that a plea agreement dismissing charges against owner but not corporation was contrary to the public interest); cf.
United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[Aluthority has
been granted to the judge to assure protection of the public interest."); United States
v. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 75 F.R.D. 473, 474-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that the dismissal of a corporate conspiracy case involving
life-saving
drugs would be contrary to the manifest public interest).
2
11 See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 313 F.3d 1152,
1156-57 (9th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cunavelis, 969
F.2d
1419, 1422 (2d Cir. 1992).
2 6
1 See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-12
(1987); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262
(1971); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
Yale L.J. 1909, 1914-15 (1992).
...
The E.F. Hutton case was the most high-profile early instance. See Notice of Plea
Agreement and Plea Agreement, United States v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 85-00083
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 1985), reprinted in Staff of Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., E.F. Hutton Mail and Wire Fraud 329 (Comm. Print
1986).
2' In a few cases brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, however, the
DOJ used a different approach. In conjunction with obtaining guilty pleas by subsidiaries resulting in criminal fines, the DOJ entered into separate agreements with regulators and the parent corporation to adopt compliance reforms. The ABB corporation
agreed to compliance-based reforms with the SEC in conjunction with guilty pleas by
its subsidiaries. ABB Vetco Gray and ABB Vetco Gray UK. See SEC Sues ABB.
Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case, Litigation Release No. 18,775, 83 SEC Docket 1014.
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4. The ProbationStage
Fourth, a prosecutor may pursue a conviction. The threat not
just of indictment but also of conviction shapes the current structural reform approach. In some individual cases, a court may decide to order supervised probation in which all or part of the sentence is deferred pending successful compliance."9 Similarly, in
organizational cases, upon a guilty plea or a conviction, the court
may impose supervised probation. At the probation stage, a court
may supervise structural reform.
Unlike in individual prosecutions, where sentences are largely
"charge-offense based" and plea bargaining occurs in the shadow
of a prosecutor's own charging decisions, ° organizational sentences reflect a range of flexible factors. The organizational sentencing guidelines consider the type and severity of an offense to
establish a base fine, and then look to organizational culpability,
which depends on a range of factors including whether top management or middle management "participated in" the criminality
and whether the organization reported the offense or cooperated. 1
Based on those factors, the court assesses a punitive fine together
with any civil restitution or remediation, including community service and notice to victims." In addition, organizations may receive
mitigation for compliance. When Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley,
it directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to consider revising its
organizational guidelines. New guidelines, which took effect in November 2004,223 explicitly permit reducing the fine if an entity
1014-15 (July 6, 2004). That approach secures compliance but also avoids harsh consequences on the parent corporation.
2 9The Guidelines were intended to reduce use of probation through determinate
sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements 68-69 tbls.2 & 3 (1987); U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 1A1.4(d) (1987) (amended 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004); Sharon M.
Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange
Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 Yale L.J. 933, 951-57 (1995).
220For individuals, the Guidelines provide a grid that "scores" on one axis the
defendant's prior record and on the other axis the seriousness of the crime. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (2005).
2" See id. §§ 8C2.3-.5.
See id. § 8A1.2(a)-(b).
223The recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines were adopted in response
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's direction to promulgate new Guidelines that could better
deter corporate wrongdoing. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
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adopts an "effective" compliance program meeting detailed criteria.224 The Commission adopted "structural reform" reasoning; approved compliance programs 22were intended to create structural
safeguards against criminality.
In addition to organizational sentencing, a court may impose
probation on an organization after a conviction. This model more
closely resembles classic civil, court-centered structural reform litigation, except here it is the Guidelines that provide the authority
under which a federal court may impose reforms. The vast majority
of organizations that are convicted or that plead guilty are sentenced by federal courts to probation. 26 Most require that an entity
not engage in criminality during a probationary period. The Guidelines also permit a court to impose affirmative structural conditions, including ordering the creation of an "effective ethics and
compliance program. 2' 27 One criterion for probation is "if such sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the or28
ganization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.

§ 805(a)(2)(5), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 802 (stating that the Sentencing
Commission should promulgate rules "sufficient to deter and punish organizational
criminal misconduct"); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 cmt.
background (noting that Congress "directed the Commission to review and amend, as
appropriate, the guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that the guidelines
that apply to organizations in this chapter 'are sufficient to deter and punish organizational misconduct"').
224 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1. Under the
1991 Guidelines, such
programs had been defined previously only in the advisory notes. See id. § 8A1.2 cmt.
n.3(k) (2003) (amended 2004); cf. id. § 8C2.5(f)-(g) (2005) (explicitly setting out the
criteria an effective compliance program must conform to); Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 158, at 50.
22' See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2005).
226See 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 144, at 107
tbl.53 (in fiscal year 2003, 148 of 200 organizations received probation, with 24 courtordered compliance programs); 2004 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 144, at 123 tbl.53, 329 tbl.53 (in fiscal year 2004, 94 of 130 organizations received probation with 21 court-ordered compliance programs).
227 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.4(c)(1).
22 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.l(a)(6). Probation is also to be ordered if necessary "to secure payment of restitution ... enforce a remedial order...
or ensure completion of community service." Id. § 8D1.1(a)(1). Furthermore, probation is required "if the organization within five years prior to sentencing engaged in
similar misconduct," and if an "individual within high-level personnel of the organization ... participated in the misconduct underlying the instant offense." Id.
§ 8D1.1 (a)(4)-(5). See also Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 Am. J.
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The court then orders, as a condition of probation, that the entity
maintain "an effective compliance and ethics program consistent
with §8B2.1. '' 229 An "effective" program must be quite comprehensive, including auditing, data collection, policy changes, training,
and involvement of high-level management. Courts now order a
significant number of organizations to install such compliance programs during probation."3 The court may also impose other sancand requiring an entions including restitution, community service,
23
tity to publicize its noncompliance to victims. '
Courts supervise implementation of these compliance programs
in much the same fashion as in a civil structural reform case. Once
courts order an organization to develop a compliance program as a
condition of probation, courts monitor the organization to decide
whether it has successfully done so. Courts largely rely on organizational self-reporting, but in a form specified by the court. 2 The
Sentencing Commission also recommends that a regulatory body
review those reports and that appropriate experts be employed to
assess compliance. 3 The court, relying on reporting and evaluations, remains closely involved until it determines that the firm has
complied and should be released from probation.
5. Civil Actions
Fifth, prosecutors may file civil actions, typically obtaining a settlement imposing injunctive reforms designed to prevent future

Crim. L. 1, 4 (1988); Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the
New Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Yale L.J. 2017, 2027-29 (1992) (describing the breadth of the probation option).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.4(c)(1).
211
0See 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 144, at 107
tbl.53 (seventy-four percent of organizations had probation ordered and twelve percent had court-ordered compliance programs). Most notable was the Consolidated
Edison case, in which ConEd pleaded guilty mid-trial and accepted a probation
agreement as well as the appointment of a special master. See Arthur F. Mathews,
Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate
Internal Investigations, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 303,430-31 (1998).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 8D1.3, 8D1.4(a).
22 See id. §§ 8D1.1(a), 8D1.4(b)-(c).
13 See id. § 8D1.4 cmt. n.1. ("To assess the efficacy of a compliance and ethics
program submitted by the organization, the court may employ appropriate experts who
shall be afforded access to all material possessed by the organization that is necessary
for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed program.").
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criminality. The DOJ has used this approach in the health care
context, occasionally bringing parallel criminal fraud charges and
civil False Claims Act proceedings. 2' The dismissal of criminal
charges against the organization or a guilty plea by a subsidiary
may then be accompanied by a parallel civil settlement requiring
adoption of compliance measures."' If the DOJ is concerned about
the collateral effects of an indictment, it could pursue such a strategy rather than enter into deferral agreements.
The DOJ has also in the past adopted an approach seeking civil
consent decrees, in which a court supervises the implementation of
any agreement and adjudicates any breach and the agreement's ultimate termination. Beginning in the 1980s, the DOJ used a civil
consent decree approach to combat organized crime in RICO
prosecutions of labor unions. 2" The RICO statute provides both for
criminal punishment and civil injunctions,237 permitting a court to
issue "such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other
23 The DOJ filed twenty such
actions.., as it shall deem proper.""
23
"
lawsuits, negotiating consent decrees in which trusteeships took
over control of affected unions or locals. 2"' These decrees were
closely monitored by courts, often involving judges in years of protracted efforts to obtain compliance. Such a supervising role closely
2"An example is the recent Medco settlement. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney, E.
Dist. of Pa., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Announces Settlement of $155 Million Medco
False Claims Case (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2006/oct/
MedcoPressReleaseUpdatedlO.20.06.pdf.
211
See, e.g., Wray & Hur, supra note 17, at 1165469 & n.334 (listing examples of civil
False Claims Act settlements together with dismissals of criminal charges or a subsidiary guilty plea regarding Abbott Laboratories, Gambro Healthcare, ScheringPlough, McKesson, Serono, S.A., Novartis, and Tenet Healthcare).
21 On the influence of organized crime efforts on recent corporate fraud prosecutions, see Kurt Eichenwald & Alexei Barrionuevo, Tough Justice for Executives in
Enron Era, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2006, at AI ("The tactics and strategies used in the
successful prosecution of the former Enron chief executives, Jeffrey K. Skilling and
Kenneth L. Lay, highlight the transformation that has occurred in recent years in the
investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime, a change that has brought many
of the techniques applied to drug cases and mob prosecutions into the once-genteel
legal world of corporate wrongdoers.").
18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (2000).
"8Id. § 1964(b). See generally Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal, Parts I & 11,87 Colum. L. Rev. 661 (1987).
211See James B. Jacobs et al., The RICO Trusteeships After Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 Lab. Law. 419,419 (2004).
2111
In only two cases was the trusteeship imposed post-trial. Id. at 420 n.5.
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resembles the traditional "public law" judging model. Where these
cases involved efforts to eradicate organized crime, many cases involved long and difficult remedial phases, with resistance by union
leadership. 2 ' For example, in the Teamsters litigation, each of
three special masters faced prolonged challenges to their authority,
with "incessant attacks against the Court Officers, Government
and [the] Court objecting to the implementation of the Consent
Decree, 242 as well as with litigation by nonparties.243 DOJ trustees
have had mixed results, with successes in eradicating racketeering
but "very little success in establishing union democracy."' " The experience illustrates the difficulty of structural reform in the face of
institutional resistance; RICO consent decrees remained supervised by courts for years, even decades. The civil consent decree
approach used courts to bolster the DOJ's authority and delegated
to courts the long-term project of overseeing compliance. Whether
the recent wave of DOJ deferred prosecution regimes will face the
same roadblocks during their intended shorter life-spans and absent court supervision remains to be seen. Obviously there are significant differences in a context where the entity may be essentially
law-abiding and seeks to remedy employee malfeasance. 45
To conclude this Section, the DOJ not only made a choice
among several options when deciding to pursue structural reform
as a strategy, but the DOJ also chose a unique approach towards
structural reform by seeking to enter settlements at the charging
stage. At that early stage, prosecutorial discretion remains extremely broad, unlike after a conviction or under a civil consent
decree, where a court supervises the remedy. Opportunities for
overreaching may be greater at the charging stage, and, at the same
time, the scope of judicial review is quite limited. Thus, the deci241See

George Kannar, Making the Teamsters Safe for Democracy, 102 Yale L.J.

1645 (1993).
242United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 742 F. Supp. 94, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
243 See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 506 U.S. 802 (1992); United
States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613-14, 617-20 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States
v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. 806, 810-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
2
Jacobs, supra note 18, at 160.
214Indeed, federal prosecutors had greater success in their structural efforts to use
civil RICO and regulatory actions to eradicate the influence of organized crime from
private industry, such as the New York garment, waste-hauling, and construction industries. See James B. Jacobs, Gotham Unbound 223-30 (1999).
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sion to pursue structural reform at the charging stage has important consequences for the future of organizational crime enforcement, which I take up in the last Part.
III.

PROSECUTORS, COURTS, AND REMEDIAL DISCRETION

Locating structural reform with prosecutors creates both benefits and problems that are unique to the role of prosecutors in our
federal criminal system. Recall the range of difficult questions
raised in civil structural reform cases that led to judicially imposed
limits on their scope and a focus on identifying the most effective
set of best practices. Prosecutors face none of those limitations.
Federal criminal law delegates to them vast discretion while, at the
same time, considerations of separation of powers constrain courts.
Further, though several structural reform alternatives were available, the DOJ chose to pursue structural reform at the charging
stage, where prosecutorial discretion remains particularly broad.
This Part first examines the question of whether prosecutors may
abuse their discretion in these agreements, and frames what calling
an act an abuse means in an area where prosecutors retain such
broad discretion. Second, it discusses how courts may not effectively limit prosecutorial discretion in these cases because judicial
review remains very deferential and limited. Finally, this Part concludes by raising a series of questions for further scholarship, including whether the DOJ itself, perhaps in conjunction with other
actors, can provide greater clarity regarding the remedies pursued.
A. Defining Abuse of Power in OrganizationalProsecutions
Despite their many benefits for the organizations involved, critics in the press have called certain terms in DOJ agreements prosecutorial "abuses of power."2 '6 Rhetoric aside, abuse of prosecutorial power is a quite limited legal concept, given the scope of a
prosecutor's authority and discretion. First, many perceived abuses
lack a legal remedy and are permissible exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. Second, other perceived abuses may lack a legal remedy
but nevertheless implicate a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities.

"' See Epstein, supra note 11. See generally also Coffee, supra note 7.
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Third, only in rare cases do prosecutors so exceed their discretion
that a court may provide a remedy.
First, critics in the press have attacked features of these agreements as involving abuses of power when in fact prosecutors did
not violate any rights for which there is any legal redress. For example, as described, prosecutors retain substantial discretion over
whether to charge defendants at all and over what charges to pursue. While I have described a striking family resemblance among
the agreements to date, critics have observed some case-by-case inconsistencies that cannot be easily explained by the type of organization involved, nor by misconduct or prior compliance.247 Some
nonprosecution agreements have more onerous terms, for example, than deferred prosecution agreements, which may indicate
"sweetheart deals."2 However, prosecutors may not cite to prior
compliance in the text of the agreement; we do not have all of the
information that they relied upon. Even assuming outright special
treatment of defendants occurred, that is consistent with the broad
discretion vested in prosecutors. Only disparate treatment of protected classes or extreme cases of special treatment may be reviewed by a court. Thus, to the extent that preferential treatment
in organizational cases raises a problem, it raises a serious question
of prosecutorial ethics, but those affected lack a legal remedy.
Second, a range of prosecutorial actions in organizational cases
implicate their ethical responsibilities. Though ethical rules typi247

See Finder & McConnell, supra note 17, at 2 (attributing inconsistency to a

"devolution" of DOJ authority); F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, The DeferredProsecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest Proposal for Reform, White Collar Crime Litig.
Rep., Sept. 2005, at 1, 1, available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/
pubs/WarinJaffeWCCDeferredPros0905.pdf ("[I]n Shell and Monsanto we have two
blue-chip, highly regarded public companies[, and] ...each cooperated fully with the
investigations of both the DOJ and the SEC.... Yet one corporation walked away
with the disconcerting prospect of conducting 36 months of business under the
shadow of a deferred criminal information and a corporate monitor, while the other
was let off with a good talking to.... Shell, the one admonished to 'go forth and sin
no more,' admitted to a misreporting scheme that allegedly cost investors billions of
dollars, while Monsanto, the one with the hammer-shaped cloud hanging over its
head, admitted to a failed five-figure bribery attempt that, in the end, cost no one but
itself.").
,8Warin & Jaffe, supra note 247, at 3 (comparing the American Electric Power Inc.
deferred prosecution agreement with the Symbol Technologies Inc. nonprosecution
agreement and noting "the curious result that some non-prosecution agreements are
quite possibly more oppressive than some deferred-prosecution agreements").
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cally do not provide enforceable rules, criticism of perceived ethical breaches may gain public traction and result in prosecutors
adopting new internal controls such as model guidelines. Model
disciplinary rules typically forbid only prosecuting without probable cause and concealing exculpatory evidence.24" None have suggested that prosecutors violated any such rules regarding organizational agreements. Model ethical 2 rules chiefly provide abstract
aspirational goals to "seek justice. 50
In some contexts, however, organizations, together with other
critics, have effectively protested perceived breaches of prosecutorial ethics. Using strong rhetoric, many organizations, lawyers, academics, and politicians have called securing organizational privilege waivers an abuse of power. 1 Prosecutors took the "important
policy considerations" raised by critics seriously, and voluntarily
restricted their pursuit of privilege waivers to limited cases raising
a "legitimate" need.2 2
The agreements may, as described, severely impact the rights of
individuals being prosecuted. 3 Prosecutors face few restrictions on
the use of cooperating defendants, except that they may not deceive or coerce (which Judge Kaplan held the government did by
applying pressure to KPMG to threaten to cut off employee legal
fees 25 4). Outside that situation, criminal law typically does not provide remedies to third parties collaterally affected by prosecutions.
In response to outside criticism and political pressure, the DOJ revised its policies to generally prohibit rewarding refusal to pay employees' attorney's fees.9 Nevertheless, while prosecutors may
promulgate memoranda with guidelines, and while such internal

24
211

See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-103(A) (1983).
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2001); see also Carolyn B. Ramsey,

The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1309, 1310-12 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 60-65
(1991).
291See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
See McNulty Memo, supra note 108, at 8-9.
29. See supra Subsection I.C.2.
2. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-4358 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2006).
25' See McNulty Memo, supra note 108, at 8-9.
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guidelines provide added notice and clarity regarding their discretion, they are legally unenforceable. 6
In other areas, the organizations themselves may not perceive
any breach of ethics even when they are the only entity adversely
affected. Critics have attacked four agreements that include
"community service" requirements, such as funding the chair in
ethics at Seton Hall Law School in the Bristol-Myers case, donating
to the Coast Guard Alumni Association and funding a chair in environmental studies in the Operations Management International
case, and funding environmental community service projects in the
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. case. 7 The Roger Williams
Medical Center agreement contained terms particularly far afield;
in that case the government feared that indicting a nonprofit hospital for public corruption would jeopardize health care to the poor
in Providence, Rhode Island. The deferral agreement required that
the hospital provide $4 million in additional free uninsured health
care to low-income residents.258 The DOJ has articulated no principle to limit the reach of such terms. Nor is there anything unusual
about those four cases making community service more appropriate than in other post-Thompson Memo agreements.
A court would be unlikely to provide any relief should a firm try
to challenge such community service requirements. The Guidelines
permit community service agreements, but caution against requirements not "directly related to the offense," and they prohibit
"requiring a defendant to endow a chair at a university or to con-

256See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1512 n.6 (2000).
" See Prosecutor to Corporation: Endow a Chair at My Law School, or Else,
Corp. Crime Rep. (Corporate Crime Reporter, Wash., D.C.), Aug. 3, 2005, at 32,
available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/coffee080305.htm (quoting Professor John Coffee as saying that the Bristol-Myers Squibb agreement implicated
"prosecutorial accountability" and as asking, "[s]hould a U.S. attorney exploit his leverage over a corporate defendant to compel it to do good deeds, such as creating a
chair at the U.S. attorney's law school?").
28See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at
12-13, United States v. Roger
Williams Med. Ctr., No. 06-02T (D.R.I. Jan. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ri/press-release/an2006/rwmcdef.PDF;
Press Release, Office of Governor Donald L. Carcieri, State of R.I., Health Department
to Renew Hospital License with Increased Oversight (Apr. 7, 2006),
http://www.ri.gov/GOVERNOR/view.php?id=1697.
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tribute to a local charity" in order to avoid potential abuses. 211 Yet
at the charging stage, a court's hands are tied. As described in the
next Section, a court cannot subtract terms from an agreement, but
can only reject an entire agreement if it is grossly contrary to the
goals of the Guidelines. Further, it can be difficult to conclude
whether there was any overreaching. Perhaps the entity itself proposed to perform community service. 2 ' After all, community service creates positive publicity and imposes minimal costs on firms,
and by settling, organizations avoid far more punitive terms (such
as large fines). 2 ' No organization has challenged these terms, which
could explain why courts have never rejected such agreements,
even if prosecutors arguably strayed from the core Guidelines mission.
Third, some terms suggest that prosecutors may have actually
exceeded the legal bounds of their broad discretion. Some terms
may be unrelated to either rehabilitative or punitive ends. In the
prosecution of the New York Racing Association ("NYRA"), a
state-franchised operation,2 2 federal prosecutors required, as part
of the conditional dismissal of the criminal charges, that the NYRA
install slot machines ("video lottery terminals") at its race tracks.
This requirement was imposed in deference to state officials who
feared that the loss of slot machine revenue at race tracks would
impair their ability to comply with a ruling requiring additional
school financing.263 The settlement between state prosecutors and
MCI included "a first-of-its-kind economic development agree2

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8 B1.3 (2005).
0The U.S. Attorney for New Jersey has stated that the Seton Hall ethics chair was
requested by Bristol-Myers, for example. See Lisa Brennan, Deferred White-Collar
Prosecutions: New Terrain, Few Signposts, N.J. L.J., Apr. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1144330167949.
2 , See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B1.3; Brent
Fisse, Community Service
as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 970.
262See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Two Former Directors of the New York Racing Association's Pari-mutuel Department Plead Guilty to Scheme to Defraud the United States (May 6, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/usaopress/2004/txdv042004may06.htm.
2. See James M. Odato, NYRA Deal in the Works, Albany Times Union, Dec.
6,
2003, at Al (reporting that "Gov. George Pataki and legislative leaders are counting
on the gambling hall to help balance the state budget" and projecting that the slots
would generate $500 million for state coffers); see also Greenblum, supra note 17, at
1878.
11
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ment" that MCI would add 1600 jobs over ten years in Oklahoma." Critics call such unrelated obligations imposed on corporations by prosecutors "Tammany Hall politicking"; indeed, prosecutors in both cases acted solely to benefit state government by
imposing conditions bearing no relationship to the alleged crimes.265
Such terms resemble similar provisions in civil structural reform
agreements under which resources are exacted from state governments for the benefit of local governments. For example, by entering into a consent decree, a local school system could obtain vast
state funds to create new magnet schools." Here, however, the
paradigm is altered. Federal prosecutors cooperate with state or
local governments to obtain financial benefits from private parties.
Such side agreements raise the question of whether prosecutors
always pursue criminal law goals. Nevertheless, firms may have little interest in challenging such terms. They avoid far more punitive
fines and the costs of an indictment by entering into an agreement.
In cases of egregious abuses, however, I suggest in the next Section
that a court might reject an agreement as incompatible with the
Guidelines.
So far I have discussed possible abuses in the terms of agreements, but one could also imagine potential abuses during their
implementation. We have little information about implementation.
It has remained nonpublic, with the exception of two examples in
which independent monitors, as noted, exerted substantial influence and detected additional malfeasance by the subject organization. Critics have cited those as examples of abuses.267 In principle,
these agreements are no different than any cooperation or probationary agreement with prosecutors in the criminal law context.
Moreover, where organizations have contracted to confer broad
supervisory power to independent monitors, calling such acts
abuses seems difficult. Nevertheless, prosecutors have ethical responsibilities to do justice when supervising organizational compliance.
2Corporate
Crime Reporter, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred
and Non Prosecution Agreements (2005), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
deferredreport.htm.
265 See Warin & Jaffe, supra note 247, at 4.
21 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 91-92 (1995).
267 See Epstein, supra note 11.
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Finally, an organization would be severely impacted if the DOJ
improvidently declared a breach and pursued an indictment. The
vast majority of agreements (eighty-three percent) permit the
DOJ, in its sole discretion, to find that an agreement has been
breached and then pursue a prosecution. Interestingly, only two
firms negotiated alternative provisions (the other four agreements
without such provisions were silent). Boeing negotiated a unique
provision where a Special Master, a retired federal judge, will adjudicate any alleged breach-any breach by an employee "at a
level below Executive Management" is not to "be deemed to constitute conduct by Boeing."2 "' BDO Seidman negotiated a provision
that any declared breach must be adjudicated in proceedings the
DOJ initiates before a federal district judge. One would expect
more firms to have bargained for such protections against the harm
of an improper indictment. Instead, most permit a unilateral DOJ
finding of breach, risking the indictment and severe collateral consequences that provided the impetus for these agreements. This
risk may be mitigated only somewhat by judicial review, as discussed next.
Problems of perceived, actual, and potential prosecutorial
abuses all flow from the sweeping discretion of prosecutors and
their ability to obtain far-reaching relief in these structural reform
cases. Next, I address a series of additional questions regarding
whether constraints exist on that discretion.
B. JudicialReview
In the classic structural reform model, "public law" litigation
fundamentally reallocates government power and places judges as
impartial power brokers in an ongoing bargaining process between
citizens and government." During remedial efforts, courts serve as
gatekeepers, approving remedies, supervising implementation of
remedies, deciding when the entity has substantially complied with
constitutional mandates, and then terminating remedial decrees.

" Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney's Offices for
the Central District of California and the Eastern District of Virginia and The Boeing
Company $ 10-12 (June 29, 2006), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/boeing2.pdf.
269 See Diver, supra note 66, at 64.

920

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 93:853

In structural reform prosecutions, prosecutors, not courts, assume the public law mantle. In the criminal system, courts typically
remain on the sidelines except in the few cases that proceed to
trial. While courts supervise structural reform when they sentence
firms to probation following a conviction, before an indictment the
role of courts remains circumscribed. In Judge Gerard E. Lynch's
terms, the criminal system in practice operates as "an administrative system" in which almost all cases are resolved in plea bargaining based on the prosecutor's internal procedures and standards,
"in absolute distinction from a model of adversarial determination
270
of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision maker.
In many respects, structural reform by prosecutors in the criminal law setting should be far less troubling than civil structural reform before a judicial decisionmaker. The chief criticism raised in
civil structural reform was that unaccountable private parties
sought to reform institutions under the aegis of unaccountable
courts. 7' Indeed, critics argued that separation of powers principles
demand that courts abstain from exercising "traditionally executive
functions," and that structural reform instead come from the political branches.272 Structural reform prosecutions answer those criticisms. Except in a few cases, the subjects of structural reform
prosecutions are private firms, not government entities. Prosecutors are executive actors and politically accountable. For that reason, they receive substantial separation of powers deference. This
is not to say deference is always justified; in practice, federal prosecutors are not wholly accountable to the central DOJ but maintain
real independence, including in the organizational crime context.73
Though both the litigants and the institutional targets are very
different from those in civil cases, structural reform prosecutions
raise similar challenges in that they rely on the same broad remedial tools. Institutional remedies raise a raft of difficult practical
and policy questions regarding their scope, cost, duration, detail,
" Gerard E.Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1399, 1404 (2003).
71See Mishkin, supra note 85, at 971; Yoo, supra note 85, at 1124.
272 Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 662 (1978); see also Fletcher, supra note 71, at 636-37
(arguing that political intervention by courts should only occur where an entity is "seriously and chronically in default").
273 See supra text accompanying note 171.
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implementation, role for experts, reporting, effects on third parties,
degree of participation by third parties, and alterations when conditions change.274 Critics of civil interventions typically called, not
for an end to reform, but for stricter and principled limits to judicial discretion .' In turn, civil courts fashioned such remedial limits. 2 76 In the school desegregation context, for example, the Supreme Court developed a three-part test requiring a court to (1)
consider the nature and scope of the constitutional violation, (2)
impose the least restrictive injunctions to restore victims to the position they would have been in absent unconstitutional acts, and (3)
take account of administrative prerogatives of state and local authorities.277 Some argue the Court went too far in hampering remedies for constitutional violations, while others argue the Court did
not go far enough.27"
In the criminal context, though problems of federalism or legitimacy of judicial discretion are not implicated, the complications
just discussed arise precisely because prosecutors have almost
unlimited discretion. Courts do review actions of prosecutors, despite substantial separation of powers deference, in order to protect rights of criminal defendants from prosecutorial zeal, but judicial review remains highly limited except in unusual cases. The
uncertain existence of meaningful limits on structural reform
prosecutions raises substantial questions for future scholarship.
Here, I look more closely at what stages actors might consider or
reject such limits by looking at the roles of courts, prosecutors, legislators, and organizations regarding (1) the approval, (2) the implementation, and (3) the termination of structural reform agreements. Where judicial review can play only a very limited role
given separation of powers deference, absent legislative intervention and so long as the DOJ pursues remedies at the charging
stage, I conclude the DOJ will chiefly define the development of
structural reform prosecutions.
..
4See supra Section I.B.
211See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 85, at 1171-73.
27
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
(permitting a court to relieve a party of a judgment if "it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application").
211See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
..See supra notes 71-72, 84-85 and accompanying text.
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1. Approval
Courts have not intervened at the approval stage during which
the parties negotiate and agree on the terms of a structural reform
prosecution agreement. Perhaps, even at the charging stage of a
criminal case, a federal judge need not accept a "fait accompli" deferral agreement. 2" None have suggested how judges can review
such charging decisions. However, the U.S. Code provides that
courts must review deferred prosecution agreements and approve
any deferral.' There is no case law interpreting that provision.
There is no commentary on it. Every judge approving a deferred
prosecution agreement has done so without any published rulings
or modifications to the agreement.
Perhaps that has been due to institutional limits on a court's capacity to evaluate deferred prosecution agreements dealing with
complex governance matters. A court is in the position of reviewing a complex agreement already reached. A court can only reject
the entire agreement; the U.S. Code does not (clearly, at least)
provide any power to modify a proposed diversion. At the charging
stage, as noted, prosecutorial decisions receive a "presumption of
regularity., 821 Similarly, in the plea agreement context, federal

courts scrutinize agreements not only for several reasons noted, including voluntariness, factual basis, and fairness, but also to see
whether they comply with the "public interest" or conflict with the
purposes of the Guidelines.282 However, such criteria are "difficult
to enforce," and courts rarely reject an agreement unless defendants were denied minimally adequate procedural protections or
there was a gross departure from prosecutorial discretion.'
279See

Greenblum, supra note 17, at 1864.
m See 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(2) (2000) (stating that the time to file an indictment is

tolled during "[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with
the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate
his good conduct").
2 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
2 See supra Subsection I.C.1.
283See Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and
the Guilty Plea 9 (1981). Just as in civil cases, where appellate courts face great difficulties reviewing discretionary decrees in institutional cases, courts here may only intervene given clear violations of legal rules. See Fletcher, supra note 71, at 661-63.
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Organizational defendants, while highly unlikely to sign an
agreement involuntarily, may enter into an agreement that grossly
departs from the purposes of the Guidelines. The Guidelines, as
noted, are far more demanding than many organizational agreements. They include seven detailed criteria for what constitutes an
"effective" compliance program2 1 that make clear an organization
must develop ways to cure systemic shortcomings.2 5 Still more demanding, the Guidelines require that a company remain vigilant in
its problem solving and "evaluate periodically the effectiveness of
the organization's compliance and ethics program. 22 An organization must "promote an organizational culture that encourages ethi27
cal conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law., 1
Courts consider best practices in an industry and take into account
the size of an organization. While courts now apply these demanding Guidelines at the sentencing stage 2" and when ordering
compliance programs during probation, in such cases the organi' See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2005) (requiring that an organization (1) "establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct," (2) ensure its governing authority and high-level personnel oversee an effective
compliance program, delegating specific individuals to implement it and report on its
progress, (3) exclude from positions of authority persons involved in illegality, (4)
conduct effective training on the compliance and ethics program, (5) use monitoring
and auditing to detect criminal conduct and to evaluate the effectiveness of the compliance program and create avenues for confidential reporting of malfeasance, (6) discipline failures to comply, and (7) after criminality is detected, take reasonable steps
to respond and modify the compliance program).
11 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 cmt. nn.2-5.
"6 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(B).
27 Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
21 See id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2(A).
2" Few courts have thus far given credit to organizations for having effective compliance programs (only 0.4% of 812 organizations sentenced from 1993 to 2001). See
Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 158, at 26. Part of the reason may be that
most companies sentenced had fifty or fewer employees and thus were small enough
that a high-level person engaged in or approved of the criminal offense (66.4% had 50
or fewer, 27.5 % had 10 or fewer, and only 7.4% had 1000 or more). Id. However, a
fair number of cases (40%) did involve mitigation for cooperation with the government. See 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 144, at 108
tbl.54.
2
" See Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating directors
may avoid derivative liability if they demonstrate "an adequate corporate information-gathering and reporting system"); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 819-20 (6th. Cir.
2001) (stating that "inaction" and failure to implement compliance programs in the
face of "red flags" supports liability); In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
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zation was convicted and is legitimately subject to punitive sentencing conditions.
Absent a conviction, the Guidelines do not squarely apply and
judicial intervention will be highly deferential. Courts would likely
presume the agreement is proper or conduct a "reasonableness"
inquiry, as they do when reviewing whether plea agreements comport with the broad goals of the Guidelines."' Applying such deferential review, a court would likely reject only a highly atypical,
egregiously nonconforming agreement and would routinely approve the rest without hesitation. Most agreements will generally
serve the compliance goals of the Guidelines, even if some of their
specific terms do not. Imposing substantial, unrelated obligations
on an organization might deserve judicial intervention.2" Yet if the
organization itself does not protest, a court would be unlikely to
act. Further, the U.S. Code does not provide for review of nonprosecution agreements. Should courts start to more rigorously review deferral agreements, the DOJ could merely secure nonprosecution agreements rather than deferred prosecution agreements.
Deferential judicial review would also likely prove of little use in
protecting nondefendant third parties, such as current and former
employees, who face individual prosecutions and are negatively
impacted by the firm's cooperation with the DOJ.293 In the KPMG
case, the District Court offered individual employees only the rem-

959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that because the Guidelines offer "powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place compliance programs to detect violations
of law," failure to implement compliance systems supports derivative liability).
91One court has evaluated the reasonableness of a plea agreement with a corporate
defendant that included substantial compliance and remedial measures, approving it
with reference to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287 (D. Mass. 1994).
292Perhaps if an agreement almost exclusively contained overreaching community
service terms a court could intervene, given that the Guidelines caution against imposing community service not "directly related" to the offense. Now that the Guidelines commentary no longer suggests that privilege waiver supports a reduction,
courts may also consider whether terms requiring privilege waivers support the purposes of the Guidelines. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Amend Guidelines for Terrorism, Firearms, and Steroids
(Ajr. 11, 2006), http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0406.htm.
2See Mark Hamblett, Judge: Evidence Shows Government Influenced
KPMG's
Defense Fees Policy, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1147338329237.
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edy of a civil suit for legal fees."' The court did not consider the
rights of those employees when it approved the KPMG deferred
prosecution agreement in the first place. Nor would doing so necessarily be practicable; it might require consolidated hearings including individual and organizational defendants. 5 Such hearings
could turn into prolonged multipolar disputes, and courts do not
typically permit third parties to intervene in criminal matters.
When former employees challenged the KPMG agreement (only
after it was terminated), the court permitted them to file motions
as amicus curiae, but ruled they lacked standing to object; regardless, the court ruled that prosecutors
. 296 retain exceedingly broad discretion to terminate a prosecution.
If Congress is concerned about prosecutorial discretion in shaping structural reform remedies, legislation could provide for enhanced judicial review. Alternatively, legislation could focus on the
DOJ's relationship with industry and the public, requiring an opportunity for public notice and comment as some agencies must
currently provide before entering into consent decrees.297 No such
proposals have been made.
2. Implementation

Courts are also unlikely to play any role during the implementation of structural reform agreements. The DOJ chose not to pursue
alternative approaches such as civil consent decrees or corporate
probation, which heavily involve courts in policing the implementation process and settling disputes. Where the parties agree to a
structural reform remedy that leaves courts out of the project, the
only mechanism for judicial oversight would be for judges to insist
2"4United

States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal docketed,

No. 06-4358 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2006).
2"5A court could perhaps, pursuant to its inherent authority to consolidate cases, enter joint rulings on narrow legal issues raised by the limited group of parties also being
criminally prosecuted for the same underlying conduct. See Section II.A. In contrast,
I find it highly unrealistic, as one author suggests, that courts broadly serve as a "fiduciary for constituencies otherwise unrepresented in the corporate deferral process and
potentially vulnerable to negative externalities." See Greenblum, supra note 17, at
1901.
2
See United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:05-CR-00903-LAP, 2007 WL 541956
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2007).
29'7See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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that a deferral not be approved in the first instance absent periodic
reports to the court regarding the progress of compliance. Such an
occurrence seems highly unlikely given that judges would have to
reach out to assume a supervisory role not sought by the parties
and in areas regarding organizational governance.
The U.S. Code provision requiring that the court approve a deferral, though intended to "strengthen[] the supervision over per' does not clearly provide the sort of
sons released pending trial,"298
supervisory power that courts have under the Guidelines at the
probation stage after a conviction. If Congress intended to provide
for supervision over pre-trial diversion, it could pass a statute to
that effect.
Absent such interventions, prosecutors will supervise implementation of these agreements, a difficult task for which they may lack
institutional competence. For that reason prosecutors understandably appear to rely heavily on independent monitors, just as a
court would, to structure compliance programs and audit performance. The criminal law context raises special challenges for independent monitors, however, that are worth further exploration, just
as scholars have explored challenges facing civil monitors.2" The
DOJ has selected former regulators and former corporate crime
prosecutors to serve as independent monitors." Those credentials
nevertheless may not always prepare a monitor for the work of reconstituting a compliance program, even if they have such experience. While internal groups might welcome a monitor to eradicate
criminality, an outside monitor could have difficulty obtaining cooperation or even information. Internal groups can mislead a
monitor and disguise criminality."1 Gatekeepers such as auditors
'9See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401,
7401.
"9See Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. I1l. L. Rev. 725, 732-35 (1986) (describing roles of independent monitors in civil structural remedies); Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons,
88 Yale L.J. 1062, 1063-68 (1979) (exploring use of "masters" in prison reform litigation).
' A similar development has occurred with the rise in the retention of independent
private sector inspectors general, often former prosecutors, by government to prevent
fraud in contracting and by private firms conducting internal investigations. See
James B. Jacobs & Ron Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a New Criminal Justice Role, Crim. L. Bull., Mar.-Apr. 2007.
'01
See id.
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and lawyers may already have failed to detect employee malfeasance or contributed to failures to properly supervise compliance." '
If they face resistance, monitors may need more time to achieve
deep changes than many short-lived agreements provide. 3 " One
monitor has uncovered substantial new criminality in an organization, which could result in additional individual prosecutions but
perhaps also complicates the compliance process."' Another, at
Bristol-Myers Squibb, recently recommended that the CEO be
dismissed. The board did so, but a new investigation is now ongo-

ing regarding new criminality uncovered."' Given difficulties in
quickly achieving reform, prosecutors may require more sustained
interventions. Indeed, prosecutors might themselves seek out judicial involvement and supervision of the type that provided an important buttress in civil RICO prosecutions. While courts may not
have any more expertise, they would have authority to modify the
terms of supervision and perhaps better adapt reform to changed
circumstances.
3. Termination

A final occasion where courts may become involved is at the
back end, if disputes arise where the DOJ unilaterally terminates
an agreement. Federal courts already conduct analogous review in
individual cases where the defendant made promises in exchange
for a plea agreement, asking whether the government acted in
"good faith" and "lived up to its end of the bargain."3 ' Almost all
1,,2

See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic

History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 287-97 (2004).
"' See Jill Nawrocki, Home Improvement, Corp. Governance, Apr. 2006, at 90, 95,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=146560723743 (describing the sustained efforts of the Computer Associates' General Counsel to "weave
the [DP] agreement's principles into the fabric of the company").
" See Troy Graham & Jennifer Moroz, UMDNJ Monitor Says Fraud, Failures Now
Up to $243 Million, Phila. Inquirer, July 21, 2006, at B01 (describing how the monitor's investigation of the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey led to
the resignation of the Dean and the firing of an Associate Dean, and uncovered $243
million in mismanagement and $35 million in potential Medicare fraud).
305 See Saul, supra
note 177.
" United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486-87 (2d Cir. 1992)). This issue arises where the
government promises to move for a downward departure for "substantial assistance"
under § 5K1.I of the Sentencing Guidelines, but later decides it did not receive such
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of the deferred and nonprosecution agreements contain provisions
in which the DOJ can unilaterally assert a breach, terminate the
agreement, and then pursue a criminal prosecution of the organization. The DOJ can then typically take full advantage of all of the
admissions of criminal wrongdoing contained in the agreement,
making indictment and conviction all but certain. Despite those
stringent terms, federal courts hold that due process prevents the
government from "unilaterally determining" that a defendant
breached an agreement not to prosecute and that prosecutors
"must obtain a judicial determination of the defendant's breach."'
Nevertheless, as I will describe, organizations may still face severe
harm.
Federal courts developed standards grounded in contract law to
interpret immunity, cooperation, and plea agreements, mostly in
cases involving individual defendants. Under contract law principles, the government is not entitled to rescission if the defendant
had substantially performed.' If "nonperformance ... is innocent,
does not thwart the purpose of the bargain, and is wholly dwarfed
by that party's performance," then the government "is not entitled
to rescission."' Conversely, defendants are entitled to the benefit
assistance and does not make the § 5K1.1 motion. Other courts of appeals either
adopt a more deferential review, see, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45,
47 (5th Cir. 1993) (government refusal to file § 5K1.1 motion not reviewable absent
unconstitutional motive), or an intermediate rationality review approach, see, e.g.,
United States v. Pipes, 125 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Copeland, No.
96-6043, 1997 WL 563141 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1997).
317United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1076 (7th Cir. 1998); accord United States
v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) ("In the context of non-prosecution agreements the government is prevented by due process considerations from unilaterally
determining that a defendant is in breach and nullifying the agreement."); United
States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ataya, 864
F.2d 1324, 1330 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A pre-indictment hearing would help prevent
overreaching by prosecutors. .. in the drafting of ambiguous plea agreements...
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986).
3
See, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9 (1987); United States v. Crawford, 20
F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Packwood, 848 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1988); Verrusio, 803 F.2d at
888.
Castaneda, 162 F.3d at 838 (quoting White Hawk Ranch v. Hopkins, No.
CIVA.91-CV29-DD, 1998 WL 94830, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Feb 12, 1998)); accord, e.g.,
United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2002); Crawford, 20 F.3d at 933; Rodriguez v. New Mexico, 12 F.3d 175 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571
(6th Cir. 1992).
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of the bargain and may try to demonstrate that the government did
not substantially perform.3"'
This inquiry is similar to that in civil consent decrees, where the
Supreme Court ruled that courts should craft injunctions within
"appropriate limits" to be dissolved after local compliance "for a
reasonable period of time,"3 ' and that consent decrees may be
terminated in stages.1 A federal court has the equitable discretion
to modify a prospective judgment or a consent decree to take account of changed circumstances."' A consent decree is treated as a
contract in that its terms are interpreted using contract principles,
based on its text and, if ambiguous, based on extrinsic sources such
as the intent of the parties when they entered the bargain."4
Those standards apply in the criminal context but not in the
same manner, due to separation of powers in the form of deference
to prosecutors. In one example, a federal court recently intervened
""See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding defendant
entitled to enforcement of bargained-for plea agreement); United States v. Hodge,
412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d
Cir. 1998), United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (asking "'whether the government's conduct is inconsistent with what was reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the plea of guilty"' (quoting United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th
Cir. 1988))).
"' Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991); accord Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b) (permitting a court to relieve a party of a judgment if "it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application").
312See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992); cf. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) ("[A] federal consent decree must.., further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based."); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (holding that a consent decree may provide "broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial").
"' See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 526-27; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court
also noted in Frew that Rule 60(b)(5) "encompasses the traditional power of a court
of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances." 540 U.S. at 441-42.
Similarly, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Court held that district courts
should apply a flexible standard to the modification of institutional reform consent
decrees. 502 U.S. 367, 392 n.14 (1992).
1,4 See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522; United States v. I.T.T. Continental
Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) ("Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction
is proper, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surrounding
the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had
to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the decree."); see
also Anderson, supra note 299, at 726.
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to enjoin prosecution of the Stolt-Nielsen company, a supplier of
parcel tanker shipping services, after the DOJ unilaterally found a
breach in the corporation's cooperation under the DOJ Antitrust
Division's Corporate Leniency Program. The court explained:
When it entered into the agreement, DOJ never intended to
prosecute SNTG [Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group]. Its goals
were to pursue SNTG's co-conspirators and to break up the con-

spiracy. It got what it had bargained for in the agreement.
SNTG's partners in the conspiracy were prosecuted and con-

victed, and the conspiracy has been terminated.
The court then enjoined any future prosecution.315 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed,
ruling that the court could not enjoin a prosecution but that the
company could raise the defense post-indictment.316 Only the Seventh Circuit counsels pre-indictment relief.317 Thus, an organization
that substantially complied with an agreement might nevertheless
face the very threat of indictment that caused it to settle in the first
place.
Absent pre-indictment judicial remedies, the DOJ decides
whether an organization has substantially complied, yet it has
never defined how its prosecutors measure compliance. The DOJ

"' Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 562-63 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
316See Stolt-Nielson, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 494
(2006). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and others as amici urged the Court to rule
that an agreement could be specifically enforced and the prosecution enjoined. Perhaps the corporation could have sought a declaratory judgment stating that it did not
breach. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 184-85 (collecting authority).
3, The Seventh Circuit recommends pre-indictment hearings, see United States v.
Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1998), while the Third Circuit, along with
others, holds that pre-trial determinations are not required. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442
F.3d at 184; United States v. Bailey, 34 F.3d 683, 690-91 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d
1324, 1330 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that the preferred procedure, "absent exigent circumstances," is for
the government to seek a hearing pre-indictment to seek relief from an agreement).
The Seventh Circuit's approach seems appropriate given due process requirements
and the great harm of improper indictments. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (stating that the pre-deprivation hearing is the "root requirement" of due process (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971))).
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could have adopted the Guidelines definitions providing a detailed
seven-part test to evaluate whether compliance is "effective." '
Lacking such a standard, it is not clear whether or how anyone determines whether there has been full, partial, or no compliance.
The agreements specify that while obligations to cooperate continue indefinitely, formal DOJ supervision terminates after eighteen months to three years, without any evaluation of success, and
with only the extreme provision that the DOJ may unilaterally find
a breach and terminate the agreement. Further, the process remains nonpublic, so outsiders cannot assess compliance nor
whether these DOJ efforts are effective.
Where organizations may only be able to raise a defense of
"substantial compliance" after an indictment, the threat of improper termination remains severe and ill defined. Only the DOJ
can provide clearer notice of its compliance goals, unless organizations negotiate for additional specificity in the terms of agreements, courts provide pre-indictment remedies, or Congress intervenes.
C. Rethinking Remedies for OrganizationalCrime
Understanding the current organizational prosecution regime as
a structural reform regime and making that new approach explicit,
as I have done in this Article, raises a series of problems for future
work that extends far beyond the traditional critiques of organizational criminal law. In the past, scholars focused on the need to
narrow the open-textured, underlying federal substantive law for
which organizations may be prosecuted, together with the sweeping respondeat superior standard. ' Scholars have advocated two
solutions for the problem of broad prosecutorial discretion in organizational cases: that prosecutors voluntarily constrain their own
discretion, or that judges narrow federal organizational criminal
law. Structural reform prosecutors then add an additional layer of
problems relating to the choice of what remedies are negotiated
318 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1
(2005). Courts also already rely
on compliance experts to define what reforms are reasonably effective to "reduce the
likelihood of future criminal conduct." Id. § 8Dl.1(a)(6).
"' See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
703, 717 (2005); William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 505, 519-20, 531 (2001); see also supra notes 106, 109.
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between organizations and prosecutors, which, as discussed, courts
currently will review only at the margins. Below I outline a series
of additional issues that arise once we understand that prosecutors
have adopted a structural reform approach. I discuss here both issues for exploration in future scholarship, and also the problems
these remedies raise for prosecutors, courts, legislators, industry,
and compliance experts.
Judge Gerard E. Lynch, Professor Daniel Richman, and others
argue that prosecutorial self-regulation of discretion offers the
most practical means for allocating enforcement resources and is
the approach that best fits our constitutional and political system.32
While under the typical account prosecutors push for high-profile
convictions and expansive interpretations of federal criminal law in
order to advance their institutional interests, 321 these commentators
instead argue that prosecutors will often narrow their focus and
create standards to provide notice and better deter wrongdoers.
However, structural reform prosecutions raise complex questions
where though the DOJ has limited its prosecutors' discretion, it has
done so in a different and novel way that raises a new kind of uncertainty. Rather than choosing to provide notice of what criminal
provisions deserve certain punishments, the DOJ has begun to
elaborate a set of explicit charging guidelines, now limited in response to political pressure and advocacy from organizations. I
have described how the DOJ has also implicitly adopted a range of
remedial principles to govern the content of agreements entered
into and the compliance process under those agreements. The
scope of the DOJ's remedial discretion raises a series of additional
unexplored issues.
First, structural interventions remain highly contextual. While
the agreements themselves provide some clarity once their terms
are compared, a set of DOJ guidelines describing the terms to be
320

See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969);
Lynch, supra note 206; Lynch, supra note 106; Richman, supra note 194; see also
Buell, supra note 103, at 535-36 (arguing prosecutors should restrict charging to corporations for whom reputational sanctions would appropriately deter); Laufer, supra
note 99, at 1350 (calling for "significant constraint of prosecutorial discretion").
32 Individual U.S. Attorneys may do so not just for internal rewards, but also for political gain and publicity. See Kahan, supra note 110, at 487 n.105 (citing Daniel R.
Fischel, Payback 98-127 (1995)); see also James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United
States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political and Legal Systems 230-31 (1978).
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pursued in agreements would be an improvement. Even this, however, may not provide sufficient notice of how the agreements will
be implemented by a local U.S. Attorney's Office in the context of
a particular organization over a period of many years. Much of the
work in their implementation remains nonpublic and may be particularly geared towards the unique problems an institution faces.
Nor has the DOJ asserted any central review over the content of
organizational agreements. The DOJ has not publicly reviewed the
efficacy of its agreements, nor has it promulgated internal guidelines to guide the content of these agreements; the approach has
emerged through ad hoc efforts and replication of other U.S. Attorneys' and agencies' efforts. Future research could ask whether
prosecutors provide sufficient guidance and notice regarding their
remedial approach and whether prosecutors, over time, continue to
proceed ad hoc or produce a more clearly defined set of best practices.
A related problem is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding individual employees of target organizations. An organizational employer is no ordinary cooperator, and the criminal procedure rights of employees when the forces of the government and an
organization are arrayed against them will continue to deserve
careful study. A separate question will be whether ongoing individual prosecutions hamper or distract from efforts to implement
structural reform.
Second, structural reform prosecutions also complicate the relationship between substantive law and organizational punishment.
Scholars have observed that courts rarely ensure that underlying
substantive criminal statutes are interpreted narrowly or that
vagueness is eliminated, in part due to separation of powers deference.322 Congress continues to pass an increasing number of broad,
ill-defined statutes. 321 Where courts do not narrow the meaning of
such statutes, prosecutors fix their meaning in practice, so that in
effect the legislature has delegated common law crime-making au322See,

e.g., Jeffries, supra note 20, at 244-45 (describing the demise of strict con-

struction of criminal statutes); Kahan, supra note 20, at 353.
323
See Lynch, supra note 206, at 2137-38; Richman, supra note 194, at 763-65; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 66-76 (1997); cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution,
and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1269 (1998).
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Structural reform prosecutions raise a set

of still more complex problems because their remedies are not
closely tied to the already often broad and vague underlying substantive law. As arm's-length deferral agreements, they need only
accomplish the general purposes of that underlying substantive law
and the Sentencing Guidelines. The possibilities for effectual judicial review of structural reform agreements remain highly limited;
courts may only exclude flagrant abuses to define the broad outer
reaches of permissible agreements. An issue for future exploration
is whether courts can help define what constitutes substantial compliance and clarify a set of best compliance practices. An important
issue for the courts and Congress will be whether pre-indictment
relief should be provided if prosecutors do violate due process and
unilaterally declare a breach of an agreement. Also worth further
exploration is the extent to which Congress could enact a range of
reforms, including (1) narrowing the underlying substantive law
applicable to organizations, (2) altering the respondeat superior
standards that create such broad exposure, and (3) mitigating the
collateral consequences of an indictment or conviction.
Third, the possibility for the emergence of best practices should
also be explored. In civil structural reform cases, one benefit that
scholars observed is that despite ad hoc efforts at first, over time
remedial law developed a clarity not found in the underlying constitutional law, providing a set of best practices and notice to all
sides. This often occurred over decades, due to a converging recognition that certain remedies were effective. Whether evolution of
a clear body of remedies in the area of organizational crime can
occur may remain an open question for some time. A related and
very difficult question for future scholarship will be the efficacy of
these compliance remedies. Given uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of these various compliance programs, it is far from clear
whether structural reform prosecutions have produced or will produce the sought-after compliance. The DOJ makes no public effort
to test whether structural reform remedies succeed in obtaining
compliance or whether other remedies should be used instead. No
public effort is being made to measure the effectiveness of these reform efforts.
324See

Kahan, supra note 110, at 484-85.
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Fourth, the role of industry and political pressure on prosecutors
should be explored further. Organizations themselves may produce
greater clarity by insisting on more detailed agreements, based on
the experience of others in industry. Organizations may evaluate
the effectiveness of these remedies and develop industry practices.
We can be confident that industry will continue to exercise significant political clout to affect the formal and informal rules governing these prosecutions. Already organizations and business groups
have successfully lobbied for changes in DOJ practices. Over time,
if prosecutors exercise essentially unconstrained choices of what
remedies to impose, organizations might demand or receive remedial clarity, concessions in individual cases, regulatory change, or
legislation. Indeed, Congress is considering legislation regarding
privilege waivers and could legislate regarding other terms in these
agreements.
Fifth, the role of independent monitors and compliance experts
is worth evaluating. These monitors may come to have substantial
influence based on their experience shaping the implementation of
these agreements. Perhaps informal exchange of information
amongst independent monitors, prosecutors, regulators, and industry experts will, over time, create a narrowed set of accepted best
remedial practices.
Finally, I underscore again that prosecutors retain fundamentally
broad discretion. Even if constrained by judicial or legislative or internal limits on structural reform settlements, prosecutors can always choose not to settle but rather to pursue a conviction. Unless
prosecutors cease to prosecute organizations entirely, all future
scholarly, judicial, regulatory, or legislative efforts to rethink or
clarify structural settlements must be understood in the context of
organizations bargaining under the long shadow of the threat of
indictment. Prosecutors have limited resources and remain politically accountable, whereas the large organizations affected often
have substantial resources and political influence. Nevertheless,
prosecutors retain a giant stick-the ability to indict-and unless
the nature of that deterrent changes, prosecutors will remain the
key to the success or failure of structural reform prosecutions.
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CONCLUSION

In its sheer novelty, the rise of structural reform prosecution
calls into question the traditional civil rights-centric view of structural reform. While Owen Fiss wrote that "[t]he structural injunction received its most authoritative formulation in civil rights
cases," 325 now it receives a reformulation in criminal law. This illuminates not only the continuing vitality of the structural reform
model, but also how the challenges faced during decades of civil
structural reform efforts acquire new relevance today in the area of
organizational criminality. Structural reform litigation engendered
an important literature regarding legitimacy and efficacy of such
interventions by federal courts. Now that prosecutors have harnessed powerful civil institutional reform tools, similar questions
should be asked again in the criminal context.
The move towards a structural reform approach is, in my view,
the most important development in decades in the law of organizational crime. Federal prosecutors have stepped far outside of their
traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, seek to
reshape the governance of leading corporations, public entities,
and ultimately entire industries. This development has gone largely
unexamined. To show the range of alternative approaches for
structural reform prosecutions, I framed structural reform remedies at four stages of the criminal process, each with mounting judicial involvement, together with parallel civil remedies. The DOJ
adopted a strategy to accomplish ambitious structural reform at the
charging stage alone, and for an important reason: to avoid the collateral consequences of an indictment. My empirical study of the
DOJ agreements' terms illuminates a consistent compliance-based
approach. These results provide clearer notice to organizations and
counsel.
Nevertheless, the DOJ exercises substantial discretion in its
charging decisions that remains essentially unreviewed by courts,
except at the margins during the approval and termination stages.
The DOJ has also declined to provide guidelines on what remedies
prosecutors should seek and what constitutes compliance with their
agreements. Perhaps predictably, one result of this wide discretion
has been some perceived overreaching, which, though mostly un" Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 965 (1993).
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reviewable by a court, has already in two discrete respects (relating
to privilege waiver and employer-funded attorney's fees) been addressed through the political process.
Structural reform prosecutions place the focus not on prosecutorial discretion to charge, indict, or convict, but rather on supervision of practical efforts to reform institutions. In the civil structural
reform context, consensus often developed over time regarding a
set of accepted and effective remedial practices. The advent of
structural reform prosecutions raises a host of new problems of
remedial design regarding the use of criminal prosecutions to rehabilitate organizations. My empirical study describing the DOJ's approach can serve as a foundation for future work investigating
those important questions. The DOJ chose to pursue structural reform at the charging stage for several reasons, including the underlying substantive law, the scope of their prosecutorial discretion,
the nature of judicial review, and the unique dynamics of prosecuting large organizations. That strategy then defined the resulting
body of ambitious structural reform undertakings on a scale never
before attempted. Now that this structural reform approach has
taken hold, however, prosecutors, scholars, and other actors should
make sustained efforts to assess its efficacy and delimit its scope.
At minimum, such efforts could clarify the relationships between
courts, Congress, prosecutors, administrative agencies, and organizations. Federal organizational criminal law would then itself benefit from a much-needed structural reform.
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Appendix A: Chart of Post-Thompson Memo Deferred and Nonprosecution Agreements (Jan. 20, 2003-Jan. 2007)326
Organization
(U.S. Atty's

NP or
DOi27

Crime

Indep.

Compliance Pro-

Pre-

Monitor

gram Required

Agreement
Compliance

Req.

Office) (date of
agreement)
NP

Sec. fraud

No

No

None cited

AEP Energy
Services (S.D.
Ohio) (Jan.
2005)

DP

Fraud
(commodities reports)

No

No

None cited

American Int'l
Group (W.D.
Pa., DOJ Fraud
Section) (Nov.
30, 2004)

DP

Sec. fraud

Yes, chosen by
DOJ, SEC,
and AIG as
part of
separate
SEC agreement

No

None cited

AOL (E.D.
Va., DOJ Criminal Div.)
(Dec. 2004)

DP

Sec. fraud

Yes: 1 yr,
agreed
upon by
DOJ, SEC,
and AOL

Yes: new policies,
including future
reporting to the
DOJ of any substantial, credible
evidence of new
federal crimes

None cited

Adelphia Communications
(S.D.N.Y.)
(May 2005)

326A

note on methodology: the charts in Appendices A and B were compiled from

the DOJ website and U.S. Attorneys' Offices ("USAO") websites, where the full
texts of deferred and nonprosecution agreements since 2003 have been publicly
posted. See Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., Significant Criminal Cases and
Charging Documents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/cases.htm (last visited May 11,
2007). I have used news searches and have not found reports of agreements entered
into that have not had their terms made public. However, I am not confident that I
have included all of the pre-Thompson Memo prosecution agreements because not all
agreements from the 1990s have been made public or are posted on DOJ websites. I
have, whenever possible, reconstructed their terms using available news sources. Details regarding parallel SEC, IRS, and other federal agency agreements were confirmed in press releases on those agencies' websites.
For ease of reading, the table has been split across two pages. Half of the columns
relating to each agreement appear on the facing page. For a printable version of the
charts, see http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/06/18/appendices.pdf.
327Nonprosecution (NP) or deferred prosecution (DP).
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

Adelphia
Communications

No

No

SEC,
USPIS

$715M restitution

2 years

Yes

AEP Energy
Services

No

Yes

None

$30M fine

15
months

Yes

American
Int'l Group

No

Yes

SEC

$80M. SEC disgorgement and
interest of
$46.3M

2 years
(1 year
if compliant)

Yes

AOL

No

Yes

SEC

$150M to compensation/
settlement fund:
$60M fine

2 years

Yes
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's Office) (date of
agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Moritor
Req.

Compliance
Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

AmSouth Bancorp (S.D. Miss.)
(Oct. 2004)

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

No

No

Revised policies
with respect to
responding to
grand jury subpoenas

BankAtlantic
(S.D. Fla.) (Mar.
2006)

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act, failure to
maintain eff.
anti-money
laundering program

No

No

Investments in
personnel and
compliance systems

Bank of New
York (S.D.N.Y.,
E.D.N.Y.) (Nov.
2005)

NP

Money laundering, unlicensed
money transfers; no antimoney laundering program

Yes

Yes: new policies, training;
new management structure;
reporting system

Retained law
firm to conduct
investigation;
shared results

BAWAG P.S.K.
(Bank owned by
Austrian Trade
Unions Association) (S.D.N.Y.)
(Oct. 2006)

NP

Banking and
sec. fraud

No

No

Yes: new management took
over
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

AmSouth
Bancorp

No

No

None

$40M settlement
with gov't

1 year

Yes

BankAtlantic

No

No

None

$10M settlement
with gov't

1 year

Yes

Bank of
New York

No

Yes

None

$12M restitution; $26M in
civil settlements

3 years
(can be
terminated
earlier)

Yes

BAWAG
P.S.K.

No

No

USPIS,
SEC,
CFTC

$337.5M to U.S.
bankruptcy estate in Refco
case and victims:
further payments depending on sale price
of bank

None

N/A
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

Boeing Co.
(C.D. Cal.,
E.D. Va.)
(June 30,
2006)

NP

Federal
procurement fraud,
conflict of
interest,
use of
competitor's information

Yes:
Special
Compliance Officer appointed
already
under Interim
Agreement
with Air
Force

Yes: training; discipline; prohibiting
retaliation; hot line
created; auditing of
compliance program
created; Interim
Agreement with the
Air Force providing
for compliance, an
independent monitor, and auditing of
compliance

Yes: changes to
ethics and compliance program; interim
agreement with
Air Force in
2005; appointing
"Special Compliance Officer"
as a monitor

Bristol-Myers
Squibb (D.
N.J.) (June
15, 2005)

DP

Sec. fraud

Yes

Yes: policy changes;
data collection; info
on website

Entering SEC
consent decree,
retained independent advisor;
personnel
changes; created
two positions on
Board of Directors; reporting

Canadian
Imperial
Bank of
Commerce
(DOJ Enron
Task Force)
(Dec. 22,
2003)

DP

Aided and
abetted
accounting
fraud (by
Enron)

Yes

Yes: auditing; policy
changes; data collection; confidential
reporting

Agreement with
OSFI and Federal Reserve of
NY (new policies)

2007]

StructuralReform Prosecution

Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ Unilaterally Terminate
Agreement?

Boeing Co.

No

No

NASA.
NASA
-01G,
USAF,
DODOIG

$50M penalty, $565M
civil settlement

2 years

No: but "conduct by
a Boeing employee
classified at a level
below Executive
Management ...shall
not be deemed to
constitute conduct by
Boeing" and
"USAO's shall provide Boeing with
written notice" of
belief a breach occurred. Special Master will adjudicate
any breach.

BristolMyers
Squibb

Yes:
endow
chair in
ethics at
Seton
Hall
Law
School

Yes

None

$300M
compensation fund

2 years

Yes

Canadian
Imperial
Bank of
Commerce

No

Yes

SEC

$80M to
SEC

3 years

Yes
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance
Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

Computer Associates
(E.D.N.Y.)
(Sept. 22,
2004)

DP

Sec. fraud;
obstruction

Yes

Yes: auditing;
policy changes;
data collection;
confidential and
public reporting

Terminate employees; add two independent directors to
board; new CEO;
reorganize Finance
and Internal Audit
Departments

Edward D.
Jones (E.D.
Mo.) (Dec.
2004)

DP

Sec. fraud

No

Yes: new policies, training,
compliance program; new executive committee

None cited

FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Co.
(N.D. Ohio)
(Jan. 20, 2006)

DP

Environmental
crimes,
false statements by
employees

No

No

Extensive corrective
actions with ongoing
supervision of NRC

German Bank
HVB
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Feb. 14, 2006)

DP

Conspiracy to defraud IRS

No

Yes: compliance
program as per
U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines; policy changes; permanent restrictions on banking
practices

None cited

HealthSouth
Corp. (N.D.
AL) (May
2006)

NP

Accounting fraud
and sec.
fraud

Yes: Governance
Consultant as required by
SEC consent decree

Yes: actions
taken or agreed
to pursuant to
SEC settlement
incorporated in
agreement

Adoption of new
compliance policies;
payments in SEC
consent decree; new
management, new
CEO, CFO, new
Chief Compliance
Officer, new General Counsel; terminated employees;
confidential hotline;
retained consultant
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

Computer
Associates

No

Yes

SEC

$225M restitution; $163M
civil compensation

18
months

Yes

Edward D.
Jones

No

Yes

SEC,
USPIS

$75M and
$200,000 in
costs to U.S.
Postal Service

2 years

No

FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Co.

Fund community
serv. projects

NA

NRC

$23M fines;
$4.3M community service

12
months

Yes

German
Bank HVB

No

N/A

IRS

$29.6M in
fines, restitution

18
months

HealthSouth
Corp.

No

No

SEC,
IRS,
USPIS

($100M in
SEC settlement; $445M
class settlement); $3M
to U.S. Postal
Service

30
months

Yes
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

Hilfiger
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Aug. 10,
2005)

NP

Tax fraud

No

Yes: compliance
program as per
U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines

Full cooperation; file
amended tax
returns; internal investigation

InVision
(DOJ Fraud
Section) (Dec.
3,2004)

DP

Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
("FCPA")

Yes

Yes: policy changes

Voluntary disclosure;
prompt disciplinary action;
no prior history

KPMG
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Aug. 26,
2005)

DP

Tax fraud, conspiracy to defraud IRS; tax
evasion

Yes

Yes: policy
changes; confidential reporting; compliance program as
per U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

None cited

MCI
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Sept. 1, 2005)

NP

Sec. fraud

No

Yes: compliance
program as part of
2004 settlement
with Okla. prosecutors and civil settlements

None cited

Mellon Bank,
N.A. (W.D.
Pa.) (Aug. 15,
2006)

NP

Theft of gov't
property, theft
of mail matter,
conspiracy

Yes

Yes: compliance
and ethics program
that satisfies U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines; new training;
auditing

None cited

Merrill Lynch
(DOJ Enron
Task Force)
(Sept. 17,
2003)

NP

False statements,
aided/abetted
Enron

Yes

Yes: policy
changes; confidential reporting; creation of a special
structure products
committee to review transactions

None cited
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

Hilfiger

No

No

IRS

Pay back
taxes, interest; fine (est.
$15.4M;
$2.7M interest)

3 years (can
request to be
terminated
after 2 years)

No

InVision

No

Yes

SEC

$800,000 fine

2 years

Yes

KPMG

No

Yes

IRS

$456M total.
of which
$228M consists of fines

14 months
(can be extended at
one year intervals: max.
5 yrs); monitorship lasts
three years

Yes

MCI

No

No

SEC

$750M restitution (SEC
agreement)

2 years

Yes

Mellon
Bank,
N.A.

No

Yes

USPIS.
Dep't
Treasury
Inspector
Gen. for
Tax
Admin.

$30,000 in
costs, $18.1M
in restitution
to taxpayers,
U.S.

3 years

Merrill
Lynch

No

No

SEC

$80M (SEC
agreement)

21 months

Yes
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

Micrus Corp.
(DOJ Fraud
Section) (Feb.
28, 2005)

NP

FCPA

Yes

No

Voluntary disclosure; disciplinary
action of employees, no prior criminal history

Monsanto
(DOJ Fraud
Section) (Jan.
2005)

DP

FCPA

Yes

Yes: auditing;
policy changes;
confidential reporting; press
release

Internal investigation; voluntary reporting; new policies

MRA Holdings, LLC
(N.D. Fla.)
(Sept. 2006)

DP

Failing to
label sexually
explicit material

Yes

Yes: supervised
by independent
monitor

None

New York
Racing Ass'n
(E.D.N.Y)
(Dec. 10, 2003)

DP

Conspiracy to
defraud; tax
fraud

Yes

Yes: auditing;
new management; policy
changes

Formation of oversight committee;
retain outside firm
to review; new policies; confidential
reporting

Operations
Management
International
(D. Conn.)
(2006)

DP

Reporting
requirements
under Clean
Water Act

No

Yes: auditing;
data collection

New policies and
compliance structure; confidential
reporting; compliance program; new
management
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

Micrus Corp.

No

Yes

SEC

$450,000 fine

3 years

Yes (for 24
months)

Monsanto

No

Yes

None

$1M fine

3 years

Yes

MRA Holdings, LLC

No

No

None

$2.1M fine

3 years

Yes (provides for notice and two
week opportunity to
demonstrate
no breach or
cure)

New York
Racing Ass'n

Video lottery terminals installed at
racetracks

Yes

None

$3M fine

18
months

Yes

Operations
Management
International

Gift to
Alumni
Ass'n for
Coast
Guard
Academy to
endow chair
for envtl.
study

Yes

None

$2M to
Coast Guard
Academy;
$1M to
Greater New
Haven Water Pollution
Control Authority

2 years

Yes
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Compliance Program Required

Pre-Agreement Compliance

Req.

PNC Financial (W.D.
Pa., DOJ
Fraud Section) (June 2,
2003)

DP

Sec.
fraud

No

No

"[E]xceptional remedial
measures" and separate
agreements with the
SEC, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and Federal Reserve
Board, and the Office of
the Comptroller of the
Currency

Roger Williams Medical
Center
(D.R.I.) (Jan.
27, 2006)

DP

Public
corruption

Yes

Yes: revise ethical
standards, in accord with U.S.
Sentencing
Guidelines; hire
Executive Ethics
Officer; ethics
training; written
reports

Yes: previously adopted
compliance program and
prior Corporate Integrity
Agreement with HHS

Statoil, ASA
(S.D.N.Y.,
DOJ Fraud
Section)
(Oct. 2006)

DP

FCPA

Yes

Yes

Simultaneous compliance agreement with
SEC

Symbol Technologies
(E.D.N.Y.)
(June 3,
2004)

NP

Accounting fraud

Yes

Yes: new policies
(training and educational program);
new auditing firm;
appointed independent examiner

Retained firm to conduct
internal investigation;
shared results; waived
privilege; termination of
new employees; new
management appointed;
restructured Board of
Directors, new policies;
confidential reporting
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

PNC Financial

No

Yes

None

$90M restitution fund;
$25M fine

I year

Yes, upon
written notice with
two week
opportunity
to demonstrate no
breach

Roger Williams
Medical
Center

Yes:
$4M in
free
health
care to
the public

Yes

None

None

2 years:
may be
extended
up to a total of 5
years if
there are
violations

Yes

Statoil,
ASA

No

SEC

$10.5M (separate $10.5M
disgorgement
to SEC)

3 years

Yes

Symbol
Technologies

No

SEC,
USPIS

$139M to
compensation
fund; $3M to
U.S. Postal
Service

3 years

Yes

Previously
waived
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's Office) (date of
agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance Program
Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

University of
Medicine and
Dentistry of
New Jersey
(D.N.J.) (Dec.
2005)

DP

Health
care fraud

Yes

Yes: new policies;
confidential reporting; training programs; create position of Chief
Compliance Officer,
new General Counsel.

Yes: cites "remedial actions to
date" without detailing them

WesternGeco
LLC (subsidiary
of Schlumberger
Seismic, Inc.)
(S.D. Tex.)
(June 16, 2006)

DP

Immigration (visa)
fraud

No

No

Yes: cites "remedial actions" taken
including "a comprehensive compliance program"

Whitehall Jewelers, Inc.
(E.D.N.Y.)
(Sept. 28, 2004)

NP

Bank
fraud

Yes

Yes: hiring of Internal Audit Director;
reporting hotline;
compliance program;
compliance committee; training program; whistleblower
protection; compliance reports to
USAO E.D.N.Y.

Yes: terminated
employment of
those involved;
committed to hiring new President,
General Counsel,
Internal Audit
Director; instituted comprehensive compliance
program

Williams Power
Co. (N.D. Cal.)
(Feb. 22, 2006)

DP

Fraudulent commodities
reports

No

No

Yes: "remedial
actions to date"
cited
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Organization

Unrelated
Terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

University of
Medicine and
Dentistry of
New Jersey

No

Yes

None

Full restitution in
amount
determined
by Monitor,
$4.9M to
Medicaid

2 years
(can be
extended
1 year)

Yes

WesternGeco
LLC (subsidiary
of Schlumberger Seismic,
Inc.)

No

Yes

USPIS,
Dep't Labor, OIG,
IRS,
Dep't
State Diplomatic
Sec. Serv.

$18M fine,
$1.6M in
costs

1 year

Yes

Whitehall Jewelers, Inc.

No

No

USPIS

$350,000
fine,
$13.3M restitution

3 years

Yes

Williams Power
Co.

No

Yes

CFTC

$50M fine

15
months

Yes
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Appendix B: Pre-Thompson Memo Deferred and Nonprosecution
Agreements (before Jan. 20, 2003)
Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance
Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

Aetna (D.
Mass.) (Aug.
1993)

NP

N/A

No

No

$9.5M restitution;
structural/policy
changes; internal
investigation

Arthur Andersen (D. Conn.)
(April 1996)

DP

Accounting
fraud

No

No

None listed

Aurora Foods
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Jan. 2001)

NP

Accounting
fraud

Yes: outside consultant

Yes: new policies; confidential reporting
by employees

Immediate disclosure; voluntary
cooperation; termination of employees; compliance program

Banco Popular
De Puerto
Rico (D.P.R.)
(Jan.2003)

DP

Failure to file
SARS

No

No

None listed

BDO Seidman
(S.D. Ill.)
(Apr. 12, 2002)

DP

Accounting
fraud

No

Yes: auditing;
data collection

None cited

Coopers &
Lybrand (Sept.
1996)

NP

Obtaining confidential bid
info during K
selection; lying
to grand jury

Yes

2007]
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Organization

Unrelated
terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

Aetna

No

No

None

$3.7M restitution: civil
assessment
$LM

None listed

Yes

Arthur
Andersen

No

Yes

IRS

$10.3M
reimbursement fund:
$200,000
costs

Gov't conclude investigation
in 90 days

Yes

Aurora
Foods

No

Yes

SEC

None listed

None listed

Yes

Banco
Popular
De Puerto
Rico

No

No

FinCEN

$21.6M settlement:
$20M fine

12 months

Yes

BDO Seidman

No

Yes

None

$16M restitution

18 months

No, DOJ
must initiate
proceedings
in the district
court to determine
whether a
breach occurred

Coopers &
Lybrand

3000 hrs
community service; teach
ethics
classes

$2.75M settlement with
gov't;
$725,000 to
Ariz.
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Organization
(U.S. Atty's
Office) (date
of agreement)

NP
or
DP

Crime

Indep.
Monitor
Req.

Compliance
Program Required

Pre-Agreement
Compliance

John Hancock
Mutual Life
(D. Mass.)
(Mar. 1994)

NP

Mail fraud

No

No

Internal investigation; voluntary disclosure; waived
privilege; new policies

Lazard Freres
(D. Mass.)
(Oct. 1995)

NP

Individual
employee's
misconduct

No

No

New compliance
policies; internal
investigation voluntary notification;
waived privilege

Merrill Lynch
(D. Mass.)
(Oct. 1995)

NP

N/A

No

Those already
enacted by company; injunctive
policy changes

Administrative payment to U.S.; new
compliance policies

Prudential
Securities
(S.D.N.Y.)
(Oct. 1994)

DP

Fraud in sale
of limited
partnership
interests

Yes

Yes (previous
SEC agreement); new outside director;
confidential reporting

None listed

Salomon
Brothers
(May 1992)

NP

Sears (S.D.
111.) (April
2001)

DP

Mail fraud

No

Injunctive policy changes;
data collection;
auditing

None listed

Sequa (June
1993)

NP

N/A
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Organization

Unrelated
terms

Priv.
Waiv.

Reg.
Agency

Fines

Length

Can DOJ
Unilaterally
Terminate
Agreement?

John Hancock Mutual
Life

No

Yes

None

$900,000 civil
assessment;
$110,000 to
Mass. State
Ethics Commission

None
listed

Yes

Lazard
Freres

No

Already
waived

None

$4.28M restitution; $4.43M
administrative
payment;
$300,000 reimbursement; $3M
civil penalty

None
listed

Yes

Merrill Lynch

No

Already
waived

None

$3.8M restitution; $4.91M
administrative
payment; $3M
civil penalty:
$300,000 reimbursement

None
listed

No

Prudential
Securities

No

Yes
(limited)

SEC,
USPIS

$330M settlement with SEC

3 years

Yes

No

Yes

None

$62.6M fine

18
months

Yes

Salomon
Brothers
Sears

Sequa

